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This project contains an extensive valuation of REN – Redes Energéticas Nacionais S.G.P.S, S.A., a 
company listed in the Portuguese Stock Exchange (PSI20) and operating in the Electric Utilities 
Industry, specifically in the Transmission sector. 
This equity research report follows the guidelines and recommendations of the CFA Institute and only 
considers the public information available as at February 9th, 2018. 
The price target was achieved through an absolute valuation method in a form of a Discounted Cash 
Flow (DCF) Approach to derive the Enterprise Value of each REN’s operational segments (Electricity, 
NG Transmission, NG Distribution, and Others) and used the Dividend Discount Model (DDM) to 
value Chilean operations, and then the Sum of the Parts Approach to determine the value of the entire 
company. 
A 2018YE price target of €2.76 per common share was reached, implying a 15% upside potential 
from the February 9th closing price of €2.43, supporting our BUY recommendation for REN, with low 
risk. To further support our final recommendation, complementary valuation methods such as Free 
Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE), the DDM and a Multiples Valuation were applied. 
Additional analysis takes into consideration the possibility of a liquidation approach and a switch to a 
TOTEX regulatory framework. Both analysis account for a lower price target for REN: €2.49 for a 
liquidation approach and €2.55 as for a move to a TOTEX Framework, though still modestly above 
the €2.43 closing price. 
 
JEL classification: G10; G30; G32; G34. 








Este projeto contém uma avaliação extensa da REN - Redes Energéticas Nacionais S.G.P.S, S.A., 
empresa cotada no PSI20 e que opera no Setor Elétrico, especificamente no sector do Transporte. 
Este relatório segue as recomendações do Instituto CFA e considera apenas a informação pública 
disponível até 9 de fevereiro de 2018. 
O preço alvo foi obtido através de um método de avaliação absoluto, mais concretamente o método 
dos Fluxos de Caixa Descontados (DCF) para determinar o valor intrínseco de cada segmento 
operacional da REN (Transmissão de Eletricidade, Transmissão de Gás Natural, Distribuição de Gás 
Natural e Outros) e foi usado o Método dos Dividendos Descontados (DDM) para avaliar as 
operações chilenas e a soma das partes para determinar o valor total da empresa. 
Foi obtido um preço alvo de €2.76 por cada ação em 2018FA, representando um potencial de 
crescimento de 15% em relação ao preço de €2.43 a 9 de fevereiro de 2018, suportando a nossa 
recomendação de COMPRA para a REN, com baixo risco. Para suportar a nossa recomendação 
final, foram também usados métodos complementares de avaliação, como o Fluxo de Caixa Livre 
para os Acionistas (FCFE), o Modelo dos Dividendos Descontados (DDM) e uma Avaliação de 
Múltiplos. 
Foi feita uma análise extra que considera a possibilidade de liquidação do negócio da REN e uma 
mudança para uma estrutura de regulamentação baseada nos custos totais (TOTEX). Ambas as 
análises representam um preço alvo mais baixo para a REN: €2.49 para o cenário de liquidação e € 
2.55 para uma mudança para uma estrutura de regulação baseada no TOTEX, embora ainda 
modestamente acima do preço atual. 
 
Classificação JEL: G10; G30; G32; G34. 
Palavras-Chave: Equity Research; Avaliação de Empresas; Fusões e Aquisições; Fluxo de Caixa 
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REN – Redes Energéticas Nacionais S.G.P.S., S.A. 
 Electric and Natural Gas Utilities – Utilities 




Date: 11/02/2018 Current Price: 2.43 Recommendation: BUY (15% Upside) 
Ticker: RENE.PL (Bloomberg) EUR 1.000: USD 1.22 Target Price: EUR 2.76 (USD 3.37) Low-Risk 
 
REN: Moving towards a TOTEX paradigm 
1. Research Snapshot 
 
After a comprehensive analysis on REN, S.G.P.S, S.A. (REN), we initiate a BUY recommendation with a 2018YE 
price target of €2.76/sh using a DCF model, implying a 15% upside potential from the February 9th closing 
price of €2.43/sh, with low-risk. 
 
REN is holding its ability to generate cash, pay the dividends as well as to pursue opportunities for growth 
abroad due to: 
1. Solid Core Business & Commitment to Efficiency: REN’s monopolist position entails the heavy 
regulation it faces. Thus, the company does not have much room to manage their operational results, 
enabling the generation of stable and highly predictable operating results and free cash flows. We foresee 
a 2017F-23F Operating Results stabilization at -0.7% CAGR, despite the decreasing trend expected in 
operating income of -1.2%, and FCFF ranging 160M-190M and 65M-100M for Electricity and NG 
Transmission, respectively.  
Significant changes in results may occur due to efficiency targets set up by the regulator (ERSE). Despite 
its outstanding performance in being one of the most efficient TSOs in the world, especially in terms of 
operational expenditures (OPEX), it is coming a new regulatory framework (TOTEX) that aims to remove 
any CAPEX bias that may appear when the company try to outperform the regulator’s OPEX 
benchmarking. This new approach aims to encourage the company to overall cost reduction and thus 
more efficiency, as it is one of REN’s main standards. The marginal effect of the switch to a TOTEX 
framework is €-0.21/sh from the €2.76/sh FCFF to a price target of €2.55/sh, still slightly above the 
current price of €2.43/sh. 
2. Strategic Debt Management: REN increased the average maturities and the weight of fixed rate debt for 
about 63% in 2018F, benefiting from the low yields period. As result of this strategy, when yields start 
rising- as expected- RoR will increase more than its cost of debt, having a positive effect on REN. A 1% 
increase in yields in 2018F impacts RoR by +0.4% while affecting the cost of debt by +0.37% (table 2). 
The expected increase in the spread between the average RoR and the cost of debt (+312bps to +340bps) 
will allow the ICR to consistently increase in the forecasted period, thus protecting REN’s earnings. 
3. Diversification to NG Distribution Segment: REN´s acquisition of Portgás gave an immediate growth of 
+13% in its RAB, which allowed to keep it above 2016 levels until 2020, tackling the RAB decreasing issue. 
The acquisition also gives future growth due to Portgás’ strong growth potential. With the expected 
increase in NG penetration rates (from current 26.4% to 35%-40% in the next 10-15 years) and the higher 
30bp return in NG distribution compared to the WACC for NG transmission, we foresee a 1.5% CAGR 
growth in FCFF of Portgás in the next 5 years, allowing to keep REN’s FCFF stable. Also, the capital increase 
expanded the free float, increasing liquidity of REN´s shares. This acquisition is adding value that is not 
being recognized by the market. 
Looking for Growth Abroad 
The cash surplus of about 433M€ in 2023F will create a better buffer to pursue opportunities abroad. REN’s 
first international investment was the acquisition of a 42.5% share of Electrogas in Chile. Chile’s forecasted 
GDP growth is at 3% CAGR over the next 4 years and expectations are for higher penetration rates in Santiago, 
reflecting the doubling in NG consumption.  
LATAM offers many growth opportunities for TSOs. Electricity generation and NG consumption in this region 
is expected to grow at 1.4% and 3.5% CAGR until 2030, respectively. Expectations are for craving additional 





























































































Closing Price Price Target 9th February with TOTEX
+15% upside       EUR 2.76
+6% upside       EUR 2.55
EUR 2.43
 
Table 1: REN market data 
 
Source: REN & Reuters 
 
Figure 1: REN Price Target 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
Figure 2: REN’s Dividend Yield Evolution 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
 Table 2: Impact on REN’s Price Target of 
1% Increase in Yields, per Year 
 
 Source: Team estimates 
 
 
Closing price (February 9th) 2.43
52-week price range 2.35 - 2.82


































Δ% in RoR 0.40% 0.40%
Δ% in Cost of Debt 0.37% 0.63%
% Gain/Loss 0.03% -0.23%
Price Target 2.80 2.71
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2. Business Description 
 
REN - Redes Energéticas Nacionais S.G.P.S., S.A., jointly with its subsidiaries referred to as REN Group, is 
Portugal’s exclusive operator and manager of the mainland transport infrastructure of the National Electric 
System (SEN) and the National Natural Gas System (SNGN). It is a highly regulated publicly listed company, 
contracted by the state with its core business of guaranteeing an uninterrupted supply of electricity and natural 
gas to mainland Portugal. As a secondary business REN operates in telecommunications as well as other minor 
domestic and international investments. 
 
In 1994 REN was initially created as a business unit within Energias de Portugal, SA (EDP), Portugal’s sole and 
vertically integrated electricity provider. In November 2000, legislation required the liberalization of the 
electricity transmission and generation business and as a part of the unbundling, REN Rede Eléctrica was spun 
off and purchased by the Portuguese Republic. In 2006, the gas industry faced similar legislation and 
liberalization resulted in the unbundling of the subsidiaries of GALP Energia, S.A., giving REN the opportunity 
to purchase the Sines terminal from Transgás. This provided REN with a significant portion of their assets, 
including the gas transmission, natural gas underground storage, and liquefied gas (LNG) terminal, which 
includes the regasification facility.  As a result of these transactions, REN S.G.P.S. was formed to recognize the 
new group structure as Portugal’s transmission operator for both electricity and NG.  Starting in 2007, REN 
underwent a series of three privatization stages.  The first divested approximately 43% of REN’s share capital. 
The second, in 2012, opened the door for the State Grid of China (25%) and Oman Oil (15%) to become leading 
shareholders. The third and final phase divested the remaining 17%. 
 
Electricity 
REN’s electricity segment is expected to generate 71% of 2017F revenues, with an operating margin of 38.93%. 
It is comprised of three subsidiaries with the primary, Rede Eléctrica Nacional, operating under a 50-year 
concession which matures in 2057.  The concession rights stipulate the full management of the grid including 
8,863km of Very High Voltage lines.  The other two subsidiaries complementing this core business are REN 
Trading, S.A., responsible for the purchase, sale, import and export of electricity as well as management of long-
term power purchase agreements (PPAs), and Enondas - Energia das Ondas, S.A. which manages the concession 
to operate a pilot area to produce electricity from sea waves. 
 
Natural Gas 
REN’s natural gas (NG) segment is expected to generate 26% of 2017F revenues, with 44.98% and 29.69% 
operating margins in transportation and distribution, respectively. Transportation operates under a 40-year 
concession maturing in 2046. The concession stipulates the transport and overall technical management of 
1375 km of high-pressure pipeline, the LNG Sines Terminal and 6 underground storage facilities with a capacity 
of 333Mm3.  The business is comprised of four subsidiaries which together deliver the full scope of the business. 
REN Gasodutos, S.A. is responsible for the high-pressure transmission of natural gas and general technical 
management of the SNGN and the supply switching process. REN Atlântico, Terminal GNL, S.A. manages the 
reception, storage, and regasification of the LNG terminal in Sines. REN Armazenagem, S.A manages the 
underground storage and related facilities in Carriço. Additionally, REN’s recent acquisition of REN Portgás 
from EDP Gás, SGPS, S.A. in Oct 2017 gave REN Portugal’s second largest gas distribution network (4,760km) 
in the northern coastal region of Portugal, with a 2017F Regulated Asset Base (RAB) estimated at €451.6M, 
growing REN’s asset base by 13%. The transaction included full control over a 40-year concession ending in 
2048, allowing REN to further exploit their proficiency in the industry.      
 
Others 
REN’s remaining segment is expected to generate the final 3% of 2017F revenues. The primary contributor is 
a 42.5% stake in the Chilean gas pipeline company Electrogas S.A, which REN completed in 2017 for €169M. 
Electrogas operates a 165.6 km natural gas pipeline starting from Quintero’s regasification terminal down to 
the city of Santiago, Chile’s largest population center. The company also operates a 20.5 km diesel oil pipeline. 
Equity method accounting for this investment results in a direct impact on the bottom line, and the stake is 
expected to have an impact of 1% on revenues, and 5% on earnings by 2018F. Also included in this segment is 
RENTELECOM Comunicações, S.A. which manages the telecommunication services with the primary goal of 
deriving profits by optimizing the optical fiber excess capacity of the installations owned by REN Group, and 
REN Serviços, S.A. which provides engineering and advisory services to third parties.  This last segment, 
excluding Electrogas, has an operating margin of -51.45%. 
 
Key Drivers of Profitability 
 
Yields: Driving Core Remuneration 
REN’s operational results face heavy regulation.  Through annually set tariffs, ERSE regulates close to 100% of 
REN’s revenues from electricity and NG distribution. REN’s core remuneration from both electricity and NG 
activities comes from the rate of return (RoR) REN receives on its Regulated Asset Base (RAB). Moreover, for 
the electricity segment there is an embedded incentive to efficient investment that provides the RoR with an 
additional premium when certain criteria are met (Appendix 25). Currently, electricity RAB at premium 
accounts for 55% of the total at 2017F and we project all forecasted electricity investment will benefit from 
this premium remuneration. The RoR is defined at the beginning of the 3Y regulatory period based on the cost 
of capital computed by the regulator (Appendix 11). During that time, it will vary in direct relationship with the 
10Y Portuguese yield, bounded by a Cap and a Floor for each activity (Figure 4 & Figure 5). As for RAB, it 
depends strictly on amortization’s relation with CAPEX, which in turn is driven by demand, supply, and the 
need for interconnection with the Spanish network system. However, the TSO’s investment is subject to 





Figure 3: Revenues per Segment 
 




Figure 4: Electricity Indexation 
Methodology 2016-2019 
 
Source: ERSE & Team estimates 
 
 
Figure 5: NG Indexation Methodology 
2016-2019 
 
Source: ERSE & Team estimates 
Figure 6: Electricity OPEX vs Revenues 
from OPEX 





Costs Recovery and Incentives: Efficiency 
REN’s remuneration is also based on the operational expenditures (OPEX) and the amortizations net of 
subsidies aiming to cover the operational and investment costs incurred by REN. The revenue component 
linked to OPEX evolves annually depending on the efficiency targets set by the regulator, which change every 
regulatory period of 3Y. For electricity concession, REN also receives a remuneration for the use of assets that 
technically still fit their purpose and continue to operate but have been fully amortized. Revenues from OPEX, 
remuneration of fully amortized assets, and recovery of amortizations is expected to yield €343.74M in 2017F, 




 Maintaining Investment at Home: REN intends to continue investing in Portugal, to maintain a 
stable RAB and keep revenues steady. Additionally, the Share Purchase Agreement of €532M with 
the EDP Group to acquire 100% of EDP Gás (EDPD) reinforces REN’s focus on the domestic and core 
infrastructure business as a top priority.  
 Commitment to Efficiency: REN has the main task to meet supply and demand of both NG and 
electricity with minimum losses, accidents, and failures. The company reported zero interruption in 
the supply of NG and 1.72% of energy transmission losses in electricity with only 0.34 minutes per 
offtake in supply interruption. This efficiency is expected to be maintained in the future as it is one 
of REN’s main standards that awarded them as one of the best TSOs in the world in an International 
Transmission Operations and Maintenance Study (ITOMS). 
 Holding the Balance: REN aims to maintain its investment grade rating and stable dividend policy 
of €0.171/sh through continued financial discipline. 
 Looking Abroad: REN seeks international investment opportunities, although a quiet period after 
two recent acquisitions is expected. One of those moves was REN’s first international investment, by 
acquiring a 42.5% interest in Electrogas S.A. (€169M) in 2017, a Chilean company that owns a gas 
pipeline in the central zone of Chile. It currently accounts for 1% of revenue and we project this 
revenue to increase to 2% CAGR from 2017F to 2020F and 4% onwards. 
  
Shareholder Structure  
REN’s largest shareholder is State Grid of China with a 25% ownership position (maximum allowed by the 
Portuguese competition authority). Oman Oil, a state-owned petroleum company, is the second largest 
shareholder with 12%. The third largest with only 6.9% ownership is Lazard Asset Management, a US 
investment manager. The remaining shareholders are Fidelidade (5.3%), and four others who own about 5% 
each. Notably, inside ownership only accounts for 2.1% of outstanding shares and 2017YE free float reached 
38.5%.  
The recent share capital increase puts REN at 663.3M shares outstanding. These ordinary shares are traded on 
Euronext Lisbon and do not grant any special rights beyond the shareholder’s general rights. The rights offering 
(raising €250M) was well received by investors as evidenced by the oversubscribed demand at 1.66x.  Despite 
the capital increase, REN’s capital structure has been stable for the period from 2016 to 2017F (Appendix 4). 
 
3. Corporate Governance  
 
Mr. Rodrigo Costa was elected REN’s CEO and Chairman of the Board in 2014. He has an unconventional 
background with 38 years of experience (15 years with Microsoft Portugal as founder and General Director and 
executive positions on Unicre and ZON Group). Mr. João Faria Conceição has been with REN for 9 years and is 
currently REN’s COO. He holds a degree in Aerospace Engineering and an MBA from INSEAD (France). Mr. 
Gonçalo Morais Soares serves as the CFO, Investor Relations Officer and Executive Director and has 20 years of 
experience in Corporate Finance. He earned a degree in economics as well as an MBA from Georgetown 
University and completed executive training at the Northwestern Kellogg Business School.  
 
Board Structure and Attendance 
There are 12 seats on the Board of Directors with only 33.3% independent, below both the generally accepted 
standard of 66% as well as the peer average of 56.4%. The State Grid of China and Oman Oil occupy four of the 
seats, contributing to the low independence rate. REN’s ISS Quality Score is 5, with 1 being the highest out of 
10, which places them just above their peer average at 5.9. This metric analyzes 200 factors divided over 4 
pillars, providing shareholders an indication of where REN stands in terms of company best practices. The 
notable contributing factors for REN’s score include board meeting attendance of 97% which is considered high 
and within range of the peer average of 98% (Table 4). Also, REN’s management remuneration structure is 
aligned with the company’s performance. Besides the normal fixed salary, compensation is tied to two variable 
components, short-term and long-term, each having a payout structure tied to KPIs which require a minimum 
of 80% be met for a positive payout.   
 
Corporate Governance 
REN follows the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance model where shareholders in attendance at the General 
Meeting elect the following to 3-year terms: 
 General Meeting – appoint and dismiss the members of the BoD, the remunerations committee and 
the statutory auditor; 
 BoD – who appoint the three members of the Executive Committee responsible for managing the 
daily operations, as well allocation of resources and performance reviews. 
 Audit Committee – three non-executive members that supervise the management of the company 
and propose the appointment of the statutory auditor to the General Meeting. 
 Statutory Auditor – Deloitte & Associates who examines the financial statements.  
 Remuneration Committee – three non-executive members who set compensation. 
 
Figure 7: NG OPEX vs Revenues from OPEX 
 
Source: REN & Team estimates 
 




Figure 8: Shareholder’s Structure 
 
Source: REN 
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REN completed a full revision of their Corporate Governance system in 2013 and adopted the full set of 
recommendations put forth by the CMVM. To date, REN satisfies 88.6% of the recommendations. Bloomberg 
reports REN’s overall Governance Disclosure Score of 60.7, which is higher than the peer average of 58. 
Also, the one-share-one-vote principle protects minority shareholders, giving them such rights as voting for 
candidates for the BoD and the right to receive dividends. Limiting voting share ownership to 25% by any single 
entity is another protection mechanism to minority shareholders, along with management compensation 
linked to KPIs. 
 
Sustainability and Social Responsibility 
REN’s sustainability strategy highlights three main areas: health and safety, including extensive on-the-job 
training including regular emergency response practice exercises; environmental protection, with an emphasis 
on climate change and minimizing environmental impact by managing consumption and reducing impact of 
the electromagnetic fields; and connection with the community, where REN partnered with Science & 
Technology Foundation and University of Porto to create a Biodiversity Department. 
 
 
4. Industry Overview and Competitive Positioning 
Portuguese Economic Outlook 
In the aftermath of the sovereign crisis, Portugal has been on a recovery path. GDP is expected to post growth 
of about 2.60% in 2017 and is expected to grow 2.30% this year, bringing GDP back to 2008 levels. The main 
growth drivers in the period 2016-2020 are private consumption and investment, which are expected to grow 
at 1.95% and 6.42% CAGR, respectively (Figure 9). 
Investment Grade and Lower Yields 
The Portuguese budget efforts to reduce debt and deficits, the GDP recovery, and the ECB’s Quantitative Easing 
program all culminated in an elevation of the investment grade rating. Currently, it enjoys a credit rating of 
BBB- from S&P. These factors allowed the Portuguese Government to become less risky in the eyes of investors, 
permitting them to progressively refinance at lower interest rates. At 2017YE the Portuguese 10Y bond yield 
was quoting at 1.932%, dramatically lower than the historical maximum of 13.557% reached in Dec. 2011 
(Figure 10). 
Demand for Energy 
The main consumers of electricity are manufacturing & agriculture, services, and residential (Figure 11) 
Historically, electricity consumption moved in accordance with GDP growth, although the mature market 
conditions should decouple this highly correlated relation (Figure 12). Electricity consumption is expected to 
grow at a +0.5% CAGR in 2016-2030F, justified by its historical positive correlation with private consumption 
and investment, already considering a forecasted +22.8% CAGR of electric vehicles circulating until 2030. 
 
The consumption of NG is divided into two segments. The electric market (EM) which encompasses electricity 
production centers, while the conventional market (CM) is composed of manufacturing (glass, ceramic, food 
and textile), residential & commercial, and transport.  
The EM is an important NG consumer. Local DGEG forecasts point to an increase of +3.8% CAGR in 2017F-27F, 
powered by decarbonization policies. Yet, the demand for NG in this sector is highly volatile and unpredictable 
due to its negative correlation with the production of renewable energy (Figure 13). The consumption of NG 
by the CM is expected to grow timidly at +0.76% CAGR in 2017F-27F. Overall, the expected growth for the 
consumption of NG in the period is +1.53% CAGR. 
Supply Side Perspective 
Renewablization 
The European Commission (EC) demands 31% of the total consumption of electricity to come from renewable 
sources by 2020. Consequently, the installed capacity increased by a +5.61% CAGR in 2010-2016 to about 
13,045MW, representing 66.84% of the total and expectations point to a persistent trend. Renewable electricity 
is the cheapest and cleanest source of energy. Hence, it is first in the order of merit to match demand ( 
Appendix 13). If the production is enough to supply the entire demand, the production centers using other 
sources (fuel, natural gas, coal, nuclear) will simply not function. However, the renewables are not a fully 
reliable source of energy due to their dependence on weather conditions and to the impossibility to store it. 
Moreover, the production poles are essentially located in remote zones, far from the major consumption 
centers. 
Decarbonization 
Coal is one of the main sources of electricity production, representing on average 22% in 2010-16 of the total 
production in Portugal. Even though coal is 50% more polluting than NG, it sometimes gets priority over NG in 
the electricity order of merit, benefiting from periods of low CO2 prices (Figure 14). The EC’s directives address 
the need to reduce the carbon footprint. Following those directives, the Portuguese government committed to 
shutting down the two existent thermal energy centers (Sines and Pego) that use coal as electricity production 
fuel until 2030F. 
Interconnections with Spain 
Under MIBEL, the Iberian electricity market works as one in terms of production and price formation. 
Currently, there are 11 interconnection points representing an installed capacity of 2,776MW Portugal-Spain 
and 2,140MW Spain-Portugal. In 2030 the installed capacity is expected to be 4,200MW and 3500MW, 
respectively. For NG transmission there are two interconnections, and a third one is dependent on both 
governments’ decision, which is on hold due to the delayed construction of the interconnection between Spain 
and France. 
Transmission Network Capex  
Expansion CAPEX on the grid will be mostly driven by the increasing investment in renewable sources, given 
the distance of production centers from the major consumption concentrations. Consequently, there is the need 
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to connect them to the network. Despite the expected increase in demand, 8,863KM of line of very high voltage 
transmission network with a capacity sufficient to accommodate the future demand. Only maintenance or 
replacement CAPEX is required from a demand point of view. Hence, it will result in a –37.59% YoY CAPEX 
from €133M in 2013-17 to €85M 2018F-22F. The investment will continue a decreasing trend, but at a slower 
pace in the period 2023F-27F. It is expected to evolve -2.41% CAGR, reaching €81M on average. 
 
The NG high-pressure transmission grid has enough capacity to support the forecasted increase in demand 
from the CM.  CAPEX will be mostly driven by the decarbonization trend. Given the foreseen closure of the two 
coal centrals, NG will gain market share, and NG CAPEX may increase. At first sight, the increasing production 
of electricity from renewables reduces the need to invest in NG pipelines, although given the unpredictability 
of the renewable production (and impossibility to store it) maintaining the grid is key. Projections for CAPEX 
point to a decrease of 63.86% from the average in 2013-17F of €24.9M to €9M in 2018F-22F. The projected 
third interconnection with Spain represents a three-stage investment of about €225M over 9 years. About 50% 
will be financed by subsidies. Only the remaining 50% will be added to RAB, but the project is not expected to 
begin before 2020.  
The Need to Go Abroad 
Given the remuneration based on RAB, expectations for decreases in CAPEX will tighten TSOs revenues. TSOs 
from all around Europe have already begun the internationalization process to areas where the electricity and 
NG markets are at a development stage, in particular LATAM. The Spanish REE has 8% of revenues coming 
from Peru and Chile, while the Spanish NG TSO Enagas operates also in México, Chile, Peru, and Sweden, and is 
part in a Trans Adriatic Pipeline project. Terna diversified away from Italy to Brazil and Uruguay.  
 
Growth in LATAM 
LATAM offers growth opportunities to European TSOs looking to reduce exposure to mature local markets. The 
World Energy Council expects LATAM’s GDP growth to be +3.67% CAGR 2017-30F, increasing middle-class 
income and urbanization rates. This will drive energy demand, projected to be +1.74% CAGR for the period 
2017-30F. The UN forecasts the average population growth of 0.85% CAGR in the period. 
The LATAM electricity framework will shift to a renewable energy-intensive production, according to a World 
Energy Council’s scenario. The weight of renewables is expected to be 72% in the energy matrix by 2030 
(Figure 15). This target will require an expansion of the transmission grid. Projected investments of $1.0T to 
$1.25T in power generation will fund the growing hydro energy leadership, along with the increasing NG 
footprint (CAGR +2.82% 2017-30F) as the main fossil fuel. Decarbonization pressures will also stagnate the 
final consumption of coal and promote electricity usage of +2.25% CAGR and NG by 3.51% CAGR. 
 
Chile: A Good Low-Risk Growth Prospect 
Expected increases in Chile’s demand for electricity of +2.74% CAGR for the period 2018F-30F will require 
investments in installed capacity, especially to accommodate the peak demand. 
The Chilean energy plan to increase production from renewable sources from the current 36% to 60% in 2030 
requires investment in the grid estimated at $1.5B for the next 5 years by Transelec, the main TSO in Chile. This 
investment is expected to be most acute with regards to the expansion of the current 7,000 km in the northern 
interconnected system (SING) area. This grid brings energy from the thermal centrals that use c.79% carbon to 
produce energy to large industrial and mining infrastructures. 
Furthermore, the transmission sector in Chile currently suffers from poor service quality, averaging 
18,77h/person of electricity outages per year according to local SEC. European TSOs have state of the art 
efficiency and can enjoy opportunities in this open-access market. Greenfield investments or brownfield 
operations will shape Chile’s electricity grid in the coming years. Investing in an A-rated country is appealing 
for foreign, stable, and risk-averse companies such as REN. 
 
TOTEX: A New Regulatory Framework Coming 
European capital bias regulatory models are shifting towards a more general and simple approach. TOTEX 
frameworks incentivize more rational, integrated, and efficient management decisions. In broad terms, under 
this approach, regulated networks would be given a single cost allowance, with a determined capitalization 
rate, thus removing the distinction between capital and operating expenditures. The industry’s thinking must 
change into making risk-based interventions beyond capital replacement such as extending the life of an asset, 
and must also examine whether required outcomes can be achieved in different ways. UK and Italy have already 





TSOs operate with concessions awarded by the government and are subject to regulatory frameworks that 
define the rules of the game, due to the natural monopoly that is embedded in these sectors of utilities. Although 
there are no competitors for REN, we decided to perform a comparison between the company and other 
European operators to provide a broader overview of how REN performs as TSO.  
 
REN - The Power of Being Alone 
REN is the sole TSO in electricity and NG in Portugal, operating as a government monopoly relatively free of 
threats of new entrants. The concessions given by the Government are awarded for long periods up to 50Y, and 
the key role of the regulator limits not only the amount of the operator’s revenues, but also the bargaining 
power of its customers and suppliers. In addition, pressures from substitute products remain low. Overall, our 
analysis reveals a favorable competitive environment for REN’s core business as shown in Appendix 27.  
 
Efficiency and Financial Edge 
Concerning operational management, REN strives to be one of the most efficient electricity and NG European 
TSO, incurring on average in 68% lower operational expenditures per km of managed line comparing to its 
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6 
peer average (Figure 19). Although operating within different regulatory frameworks, TSOs do not have much 
control above the EBIT line due to the embedded restrictions set by the regulators.  
Hence, REN attempts to improve its results with rigorous and conservative financial management to reduce the 
financial costs as much as they can, helping them maintain stability and keep the constant dividend. 
 
Baby Steps Abroad  
REN operates in a mature market so investment opportunities are becoming scarcer. To cope with the resulting 
decrease in RAB, REN must look out for opportunities for growth abroad. The recent Electrogas acquisition 
came as an opportunity due to an asset sale by the Italian company ENEL, but highlights the abovementioned 
need.  The fact that this asset is not regulated further opens an opportunity for REN to diversify its sources of 
revenues in one of the most developed economies in LATAM, Chile, in which GDP per capita is expected to grow 
at +3.02% over the next 4 years (Figure 17).  
The supply of natural gas is protected by long-term contracts with take-or-pay provisions, providing extra 
security. Penetration rates in Santiago are expected to grow from 20% to 40% in the next 10-15 years, 
reflecting expectations that consumption of gas will double as the preferred source for heat over other 
substitutes, such as coal.  
The acquisition did not have material impact on REN’s credit rating or dividend policy because it was financed 
using credit lines available within the group coupled with Chile’s current low-risk investment grade rating. REN 
is sensing the opportunity to increase its stake in Electrogas, given the attractive low levels of debt. However, 
the short run plan is to digest this acquisition and only advance in activist policies if it becomes relevant to 
REN’s credit rating or dividend policy. 
 
Initial Projects in Gas Distribution 
As the sole NG distribution operator in Portugal, REN was in a unique position to gain vertical integration in 
NG infrastructure. Keeping the focus in Portugal, in a low-risk way, the company acquired the entire share 
capital of EDP Gas, subsequently renamed REN Portgás. We predict a +3.07% CAGR growth potential in FCF in 
the next 5 years, based on Portgás’ low penetration rate when compared with Lisboagás, the other main 
distributor in a high population density area. REN paid €532M although the Portgás RAB was around €450M 
2016YE. The premium was paid due to Portgás’s growth potential and because REN expects a 30 bps higher 
return than the WACC for NG transmission.  
Funding of the acquisition was secured by a €250M capital increase through a rights issue and was followed by 
a debt issuance of €300M (1.768% yield). Instead of reducing the DPS, they opted for a capital increase so that 
they could expand free float and increase the market liquidity for REN’s shares (Appendix 21). REN is expert in 
managing regulated gas assets, knows the technology, the market, and all the business complexity it involves; 
thus, the acquisition entails low integration risk. 
Although REN does not have an aggressive internationalization plan in place, it will remain opportunistic with 
foreign investments, and we believe that expansion in LATAM is inevitable for REN to grow and to diversify its 
portfolio. 
 
5. Investment Summary 
 
We issue a BUY recommendation on REN with a target price of €2.76/sh for 2018YE using a FCFF method with 
an upside potential of 15% with low-risk. The recent drop in price in line with the entire global stock market, 
the capital dilution, the debt restructuring, cash generating operations in Portugal, the potential to grow in 
LATAM, and a strong dividend policy opens room for an increase in the share price, thus justifying our 
recommendation. 
 
Key Value Drivers and Potential Catalysts 
The recent restructuring of debt plays a pivotal role in REN’s outlook when yields start rising. RoR is based on 
a theoretical WACC set up by ERSE, estimated between 5.25% and 5.92% for REN’s segments in 2018F, while 
WACC is estimated at 3.83% driven by a 1.54% after-tax cost of debt and high leverage. REN’s timing to extend 
debt maturities and to move from floating rates to fixed rates benefited from decreasing yields for Portugal and 
from its investment grade rating (BBB- with a positive outlook). The latest 1.768% yield on a €300M bond 
issuance is an example. The hedging of the cost of debt with about 63% debt financed at fixed rates in 2018F 
mitigates the effects of an expected increase in yields. A +100bps in yields in 2018F affects RoR by +40bps and 
the cost of debt by +37bps as result of this policy (Table 5). 
 
The acquisition of Electrogas was the first foot in LATAM. The premium paid for a non-controlling stake of 
42.5% signals the aim for international diversification. This subsidiary accounts for €0.20/sh of REN, 
incorporating the 2017 capital increase and debt issuance. Chile’s expected GDP growth is at +3.02% CAGR for 
2017F-23F and penetration rates in Santiago are expected to increase from 20% to 40% in the next 10-15 
years, meaning that expansion of the grid is critical to accommodate a doubling in consumption. The 
perspective of a controlling stake in this company will boost returns, given the room for capital structure 
optimization and high cash flow visibility supported by long-term take or pay contracts for the supply of NG in 
the country. We take a conservative approach, taking into consideration the limited growth in Portugal and a 
2.5% CAGR in Electrogas. Any growth in LATAM will drive an upside on REN’s valuation. 
 
The strong cash flow generation of the company through solid operations in the country will boost the cash 
surplus to about €433M in 2023F (Appendix 3). Also, the expected end of ESEC in 2019F will have several side 
effects. This will deleverage the firm given the limited investment opportunities within Portugal, allow for the 
increase of the €113M cash dividend by 2.5% YoY from 2020F-23F, and will generate a better buffer to explore 
opportunities abroad. 
 
REN’s operations in Portugal will remain solid, as the firm operates a natural monopoly in the transmission 
of Electricity and NG, and along with the recent acquisition of REN PORTGAS will provide room for a +320bps 
in operating margins from 2016-2023F and the entrance in the distribution segment of NG (Appendix 4). The 
distribution grid in the North of Portugal covers about 21.7% of the mainland, is expected to contribute 
€451.6M to RAB in 2017F and offers potential to grow given expectations for an increase to 35%-40% in the 
Figure 17: Real GDP Growth vs Inflation 





Figure 18: Porter’s Five Forces 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
Figure 19: REN vs Peers Efficiency 16YE 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
 Table 5: REN’s Sensibility to Yields 
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penetration rate. The distribution is remunerated at +30bps versus the transmission of NG, following the same 
regulatory scheme (Appendix 9). 
REN has a current 6.9% dividend yield, the highest between selected peers, stable operations and 
investment-grade credit rating, placing the stock as a possible bond proxy. Investors go long in this stock 
looking to receive a very stable stream of cash flows over time with limited risk. This clientele effect is 
supported by our €2.53/sh fair value estimation using the dividend discount model (DDM). 
 
Valuation methods 
To compute REN´s target price we derive the Enterprise Value of each segment (Electricity, NG transmission, 
NG distribution and Others) through FCFF and use the DDM to value Chilean operations, using a SoP approach. 
As complementary methods we used FCFE, arriving at a €2.77/sh, the DDM, yielding €2.53/sh, and a multiples 
valuation through EV/EBITDA, P/E, and P/D multiples that are in line with our base 2018YE valuation of 
€2.76/Sh.  
 
Risks to Achieve Price Target 
Investors should be aware of the impact that 10 Y Portuguese yields have on results. Decreases in RAB due 
to a lower investment will impact REN’s ability to grow revenues. ESEC remains a big concern. Despite 
expectations about its end by 2019, a continuation of the levy will impact REN’s capacity to sustain increases 
in dividends, leading to unsustainable payout ratios, around 90%. A Liquidation valuation after the end of the 
concessions accounts for a drop of €-0.27/sh, changing the target price for REN to €2.49/sh, still modestly 
above the current price. 
 
6. Valuation 
SoP: FCFF for the Core 
REN’s core business is valued using a FCFF model to derive the EV of each operational segment (Electricity, NG 
transportation, NG distribution, and Others) along with the DDM and a price multiple to value the current 
42.5% stake in Electrogas. This approach yields a 2018YE price target of €2.76/sh (Appendix 22). 
Complementary approaches for the entire company using a FCFE model, the DDM, and a multiples approach 
support the BUY recommendation. The upside potential of 15% and the low risk makes REN an attractive stock 
for investors targeting a current dividend yield of around 7.0% in a BBB-rated and very stable company. The 
valuation follows a going concern, but a liquidation approach on the maturity of each concession accounts for 
€-0.27/sh to €2.49/sh, still supporting the positive outlook for REN (Appendix 24). Our valuation is mainly 
influenced by the following factors: 
Portuguese 10Y Yields Drive Revenues 
The expectation of a normalization in yields after the end of ECB’s QE and the recent figures in the US points 
for increases in yields across Europe, reflecting the improvement of economic indicators. The outlook for yields 
and REN’s RoR are estimated through the computation of forward rates starting in 5 years for a 10-year period 
(Appendix 9). REN’s cost of debt parallels our expectations for yields, as we are assuming a -28bps spread, 
which corresponds to the rates difference between REN’s and the Portuguese government’s most recent bond 
issues, except for the hedged part of the debt of about 63%. This represents a large source of the upside in price 
target. 
Regulated Asset Base (RAB) 
REN’s RAB has been showing a progressively decreasing trend since 2014, however, this was disguised by two 
recent acquisitions. RAB increased by €70.5M following the acquisition of the GALP NG caverns in 2015, and 
by €451.6M with the purchase of EDP Portgás in 2017. With all of mainland Portugal electrified there is little 
room for REN to grow within the country in the electricity segment. Supported by both PDIRT-E (Plano 
Desenvolvimento e Investimento da Rede de Transporte de Eletricidade) and PDIRGN (Plano de 
Desenvolvimento e Investimento da Rede de Gás Natural) a decrease in RAB is expected because depreciations 
will surpass CAPEX. Estimations of changes in RAB are subject to adjustments by ERSE on embedded efficiency 
incentives. From 2016 onwards, we take a conservative approach. REN’s CAPEX is assumed to be transferred 
to RAB, implying the end of subsidies for new investments in both electricity and NG segments. In electricity 
the investment made with a cost lower than the reference cost will be remunerated at a higher rate (Appendix 
25). CAPEX is expected to be paid at a premium in electricity. The third connection of NG with Spain is expected 
to add €58M CAPEX starting in 2020 (Appendix 10). 
Incentives to Economic Rationalization 
Regarding electricity, the company is provided with a remuneration on fully amortized assets that are kept in 
operation. Our assumptions follow what is stated in “Proveitos Permitidos e Ajustamentos para 2017 das 
empresas reguladas do sector Eléctrico”: €21.9M for 2017F and €25.0M/year for 2018F-19F. For the following 
years we forecast a +8.0% YoY growth for 2020F and +9.0% YoY from then onwards, since we expect that this 
incentive will increase in the future driven by: 1) an enlargement of fully amortized asset base, and 2) the 
ceaseless objective of ERSE to protect consumers from unneeded investments. 
Recovery of OPEX 
REN is provided with a mechanism that allows the recovery of its operational expenditures related with the 
transmission of electricity and NG and the distribution of NG. Given the complexity of computation of this 
remuneration, we consider that the recovery of OPEX will evolve YoY based on the Portuguese GDP Deflator 
minus an efficiency factor set by ERSE for each segment. OPEX is estimated to evolve at -1.03% CAGR 
2018F-2023F. REN has been able to recover more than its OPEX, proving efficiency in its operations (Figure 6 
&Figure 7). 
Energy Sector Extraordinary Contribution (ESEC): A Turnaround 
We project that this extraordinary levy will end in 2019, by the end of the legislature. All companies in the 
sector except REN and ENDESA have already decided to forego the contribution, and have instead sued the 
Portuguese State on the Constitutional Court. Forecasts are that this levy will not hold in the future, following 


















Table 6: REN’s Price Target 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
 
Table 7: REN’s WACC 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Figure 20: REN vs Peers Multiples 
 
Source: Bloomberg & Team estimates 
 
Table 8: Peers’ Group 
 





Segment Model g % EUR
EV Elect. FCFF 0.5% 63.6% 2,791.8
EV NG FCFF 0.4% 26.7% 1,171.2
EV Portgas FCFF 2% 9.5% 416.8
EV Others FCFF 0.6% -3.3% (142.9)




Price Target 18YE/sh 2.76
DCF Analysis 2018F Terminal
COST OF EQUITY
Risk Free Rate (RFR) 0,7% 2,5%
Country Risk Premium (CRP) 1,4% 2,2%
Beta (β) 0,6 0,6
Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 8,5% 8,5%
Cost of equity 7,2% 9,8%
COST OF DEBT
Cost of debt 2,2% 3,6%
Marginal tax rate 30,8% 30,8%
After-tax cost of debt 1,5% 2,5%
Weight of equity 40,3% 40,0%























the base case valuation. A positive decision by the Court may add up to €0.13/sh to REN’s price target, including 
interest. 
FCFE and DDM 
These complementary approaches are useful in valuing company. In the case of FCFE, it is supported by the 
stable capital structure the company has maintained and is expected to maintain. The use of the DDM is justified 
with the stable dividend payment of the company. Also, the €2.53/sh derived by the DDM supports the clientele 
effect, meaning that investors look to the stock not in a controlling perspective or with the aim of realizing 
capital gains, but to receive a stable stream of cash flows with low-risk. We are assuming an increase of +2.5% 
YoY starting on 2020 following the end of ESEC (Appendix 23).  
WACC Assumptions 
Applying the CAPM model, we are assuming a Cost of Equity that ranges from 7.1% to 8.0% in the forecasted 
period. We are using the 10Y German yield annual forecasted average as the RFR, ranging from 0.66% in 2018 
and 1.45% in 2023. We are adding to the model an average CRP of 2.0%, equalling the spread between the 
RFR and a 2-year average of forecasts for the 10Y Portuguese bond yield. The Beta is around 0.6, which was 
derived using a pure-play method from peer average betas. That value was supported by regressing REN’s 
returns against the PSI20, Euronext 150 and EUROSTOXX600 returns. The ERP is 8.5% and comes from the 
relation between the REN and the PSI20, given the company’s almost 100% exposure to Portugal, and takes 
into consideration our forecast for the future volatility of the index (Appendix 20).  
Cost of Debt is linked with the assumptions for the 10Y Portuguese yield with a spread of -29bps. It will be 
inside the 2.23%-2.76% range, which is much lower than just 29bps from 10Y yields due the 65% fix rate debt 
cost of financing (Appendix 19). As such, and considering the relatively stable market capital structure around 
60% D/EV, WACC will range from 3.8% in 2018 to 4.8% in 2023.   
Proper Peer 
Valuation multiples are used as a complementary approach. We employ the Sum of Absolute Rank Differences 
(SARD) approach developed by Knudsen et al. (2017) as a basis for the search for the proper peer group, as 
REN is the sole TSO in Portugal. The Euro Stoxx 800, FTSE 100, and the S&P Latin America 40 constituents 
supplied the potential peer group. Once the SARD was calculated for each company, a subjective decision was 
made to exclude companies based on unrelated industry classifications. The resulting peer group has an 
average D/D+E ratio (based on book values) of 66.1%, in line with the 68.6% of REN. Also, average operating 
margins of 52.4% are in line with the 52% of REN, excluding National Grid and ELIA (Appendix 17).  
Multiple Valuation 
As a stable, regulated utility, the standard multiples are suitable for REN’s valuation, and in this regard the 
EV/EBITDA, P/E, and P/D ratios were used for the analysis. The final metric, the P/D ratio, is not often used 
but is indeed just an inversion of the dividend yield, a significant factor in the value proposition of investing in 
utility shares. The company appears undervalued based on its EV/EBITDA (8.94x), P/E (12.74x) and 
P/Dividend (14.68x) multiples (Figure 20). These multiples are at discount when compared with the peer 
medians of 10.79x, 13.63x and 18.37x, respectively. However, adjusted multiples to account for historical 
discounts do not deviate our recommendation (Appendix 18). REN’s historical lower market cap and liquidity 
and country risk are potential drivers of these historical discounts. 
EV/EBITDA and P/D support the upside potential, generating values of €2.62/sh (+7.59%) and €2.81/sh 
(+16.13%), respectively, while P/E points to a potential downside of €2.06/sh (-17.23%). However, we believe 
that P/E could be the most biased of these multiples, given the varying countries of domicile and capital 
structures (Figure 21) amongst peers. Figure 22 shows a heatmap of all possible valuations resulting from 
relative weight combinations of the three multiples. 
 
7. Financial Analysis 
 
Operations Set on Cruise Control 
REN’s operations are bounded by strict regulation reflected in the stability of its operating margins (+35.40% 
in 2016 with an average YoY growth of +46bps until 2023F). This improvement is explained by the €400M RAB 
increase in 2017F. REN benefited from the inclusion of REN PORTGAS (€451.6M) and from an expected 
growing trend for RoR (5.35% in 2018F to 5.97% in 2023F), explained by estimates for the increase in 10Y 
Portuguese Yields (2.08% to 3.52% from 2018F-23F)- Appendix 9 & Appendix 19. 
 
Focus on Operational Efficiency 
The company is expected to maintain the pace of recovering OPEX in its operating segments during 2017F-23F 
(c.120%) (Figure 23). This reflects compliance with the regulatory mechanism of ERSE, although REN does not 
benefit from being more efficient than the regulator demands. ERSE will adjust efficiency parameters as long 
as the company proves to enhance efficiency, shrinking the room for accumulated efficiency gains. The 
limitation in terms of efficiency gains is reflected in 0.11 asset turnover stable from 2012-23F. 
 
Prudent and Strategical Debt Management 
The increase in maturities and the change from floating to fixed rates allowed the company to consistently 
decrease the cost of debt from 5.70% in 2012 to 3.20% in 2016. In 2017F around 56% of total debt is expected 
to be financed at fixed rates powering a total cost of 2.70%. Fixing rates accounts for €0.40/sh in our valuation 
when comparing with a scenario of debt entirely at floating rates. REN is prepared for the expected and 
generalized increase in yields. The difference between RoR and cost of debt is expected to increase in 2018F-
22F, from +312 bps to +340bps, leading to a better ICR (from 3.94 to 4.18). This spread will decrease to +308 
bps in 2023F (Figure 24). The Debt-to-Capital ratio will decrease slightly from 0.66 to 0.6 (2017F-23F), 
reflecting REN’s smooth deleveraging given limited investments perspectives. NPM will jump from 17.06% 
2016 to 22.22% 2023F, excluding ESEC effects. ROE will stabilize at around 10% in 2018F-2023F driven by a 
low-interest burden. 
 
Figure 21: Debt/Equity Ratios 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Figure 22: Multiples Valuation Heat Map 
 
Source: Team estimates  
 
Figure 23: OPEX Efficiency 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Figure 24: Hedging Strategy Results 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Figure 25: REN WACC vs RoR 
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Solid Cash Generation 
FCFF will range between €252.5M and 304.9M from 2017F-23F, given strong generation of operational cash 
flow (earnings quality consistently above 1 from 2017F to 2023F). The inevitable decrease in CAPEX, the 
normalization of outflows from financing activities, and the end of the levy in 2019F will open room for a 
growth in dividends of 2.5% YoY from 2019F-23F. The forecasted cash surplus of €433M in 2023F will allow 
the company to keep the investment in the internationalization strategy when the right opportunity arises. 
 
RoR vs WACC 
ERSE sets RoR (i.e., the theoretical WACC) for each activity considering a theoretical gearing ratio (D/E) of 55% 
for electricity and 50% for NG. Within sustainable levels, REN has an incentive to keep leverage above those 
targets. It decreases REN’s real cost of capital, which enables the company to earn abnormal returns. This is 




We estimate the end of the ESEC levy from 2020F onwards. This gain in cash is expected to be allocated to 
increases in dividends, arriving at a payout ratio of 85% in 2023F. The company decided to pay the levy. Yet, 
they are litigating. In the case of a win (lose) REN would receive (pay) in interest more than its cost of debt, 
which resembles to a gain in “lending” money to the state. The most probable scenario is the end of the levy, 
although without reimbursements. A full reimbursement after its end in 2019F would account for +€0.23/sh 
in our valuation, plus interest. Oppositely, if the levy persists in perpetuity REN’s valuation adjusts €-0.15/sh 
to €2.61/sh. ESEC impacts -340 bps on NPM, average 2014-19F. 
 
 
8. Investment Risks 
 
Regulatory Risk | ERSE (RR1)  
ERSE’s adjustments to the regulatory parameters have significant impact on allowed revenues and costs 
embedded in the tariffs, limiting REN’s ability to create value. Yet, the company has established a good 
relationship with the regulator and maintains its efficiency aligned with regulator’s guidance. The increase in 
the regulatory period from three to four years under discussion will also bring forward more clarity and 
stability. The recent acquisition of Electrogas is a way to diversify its revenues and to gain independence from 
the local regulator. 
 
Regulatory Risk | RAB-based Model (RR2) 
The RAB-based model fits better for countries that are under-developed and require greater capital-
investment. With CAPEX below amortizations, RAB and revenues will decrease. The current model also 
promotes non-rational decisions. For instance, it does not incent the company to apply for EU Funds for 
infrastructure investment or retaining underperforming assets because they account for RAB purposes. 
Acquisitions, such as PORTGAS, would help to enlarge the RAB and smooth these effects. REN should be careful 
on this type of deals to avoid paying high premiums and to follow a conservative approach. 
 
Political Risk | ESEC Levy – Extraordinary Contribution for the Energy Sector (PR1) 
The possibility of the levy to continue beyond 2019 would impact earnings by about €30M per year. The levy 
would limit REN’s ability to invest domestically and internationally. It may also jeopardize the dividend policy, 
implying consistently payout ratios above 90%. The decision is in the hands of the Constitutional Court, but the 
expectations are for it to be revoked in 2019F. 
 
Market Risks | Changes in Yields (MR1) 
Changes in yields directly impact REN’s revenues. Yields also affect the cost of debt. The debt management 
policy taken by the company smooths and hedges these impacts in the short-term. The mechanism of caps and 
floors imposed by ERSE limits REN when yields are very high but protects the company in times of very low 
rates. A sudden and high increase in yields can have a negative impact on the company because RoR will not 
evolve in the same proportion and the increase in the cost of debt may offset the positive effect on revenues.  
 
Operational Risk | Liquidation Perspective (OR1) 
Ceasing concessions in the electricity and NG segments may imply the liquidation of REN’s domestic business. 
The company has know-how in this industry and has been operating under efficiency targets. The likelihood of 
renewing the concession contracts is high. Although, a liquidation scenario would imply a drop of €0.27/sh, 
given the projected RAB growth. 
 
Financial Risk | Dividend Policy Maintenance (FR1)  
The maintenance of a stable dividend policy is one of REN’s main goals and strategies. Despite the stability on 
its core business, the company’s recent capital increase amplifies the cash dividend by +25%. Yet, the DPS is 
expected to remain stable in the period 2017F-20F. The dividend policy is key for REN, as it benefits massively 
from the clientele effect for a juicy and riskless dividend (Figure 27). 
 
Financial Risk | Credit Rating Deterioration (FR2) 
REN’s stable operations should in theory adjust the cost of debt spread with the Portuguese yields to a situation 
in which they are both in line with each other. The fact that a sovereign country should be safer than a local 
company, especially one that has 100% exposure to the local economy, should hold in the long term. Therefore, 
the current estimated -28bps spread is expected to not persist in the future. Possible negative occurrences 
within the company, such as losing investment grade, may project this spread above the country risk, a case in 
which hedge mechanisms would not ease the negative effects in earnings.  
 















Figure 26: Risk Matrix 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Figure 27: DPS vs Payout-ratio 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
























































Risks to Price Target 
 
ESEC Levy:  The base case assumes that the levy will cease in 2019. However, this outcome carries significant 
uncertainty and for that reason alternative scenarios were tested. The forecasts for the levy accounts on 
average to 21% net income. Still, it will only result in a downside potential in the scenario that it lasts in 
perpetuity. 
  
Table 9: Scenario ESEC Levy ending in: 
  
 
Terminal Growth Rates: This is one of the most important variables when applying DCF models. REN is 
expected to grow very slowly. Lower growth rates than those modeled could potentially change our 
recommendation.  Nevertheless, only if the company show no growth in both of electricity and NG segments 
will provide downside potential.  
  
Table 10: Sensitivity analysis for the Terminal Growth Rates 
 
 
10Y Portuguese Bond Yields & REN’s Cost of Debt: In our assumptions we are considering a constant growth 
(+29bps YoY) for the yields. Yields are very unpredictable. Expectations point to an increase in the near future, 
but nobody can know at exactly what pace. For instance, the foreseen end of the ECB’s QE program might bring 
an increase in yields. Moreover, an increase in inflation rates to the ECB’s target of 2% will also affect interest 
rates. We account for this by stressing the assumed growth in yields. 
 
Table 11: Sensitivity analysis for the 10Y Portuguese Bond Yield 
 
 
Spread Between Cost of Debt (Rd) and 10Y Portuguese Bond Yields: We forecast the spread to have a linear 
and constant relationship with the yields (-28bps) until 2023YE, and for the terminal period the spread 
conservative at zero. However, this assumes that REN’s Rd is only affected by the country risk. Nevertheless, 
REN’s specific issues can jeopardize the Rd (e.g. scandals, decrease in rate due to a bad investment, etc). In our 
base case scenario for the yields a 38bps increase in the spread would be needed to change our 
recommendation.  
 
Monte Carlo Simulation 
As a complementary analysis to our price target we perform a Monte Carlos simulation. Our forecast is mostly 
sensitive to electricity segment growth rate, and interest rates in the perpetuity. The average PT is €2.71, very 






2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 Perpetuity
Price Target 18YE 2.79 2.76 2.72 2.69 2.66 2.62 1.93
Upside Potencial 16.7% 15.2% 13.5% 12.0% 10.5% 9.0% -22.7%
Recommendation BUY BUY BUY BUY BUY HOLD SELL
Price Target
2.76 0.00% 0.10% 0.20% 0.30% 0.40% 0.50% 0.60% 0.70% 0.80% 0.90% 1.00%
0.00% 2.40 2.45 2.50 2.56 2.61 2.67 2.73 2.79 2.86 2.93 3.00
0.10% 2.42 2.47 2.52 2.58 2.63 2.69 2.75 2.81 2.88 2.95 3.02
0.20% 2.44 2.49 2.54 2.60 2.65 2.71 2.77 2.84 2.90 2.97 3.04
0.30% 2.47 2.51 2.57 2.62 2.68 2.73 2.80 2.86 2.92 2.99 3.06
0.40% 2.49 2.54 2.59 2.64 2.70 2.76 2.82 2.88 2.95 3.02 3.09
0.50% 2.51 2.56 2.61 2.67 2.72 2.78 2.84 2.91 2.97 3.04 3.11
0.60% 2.54 2.59 2.64 2.69 2.75 2.81 2.87 2.93 3.00 3.06 3.14
0.70% 2.56 2.61 2.67 2.72 2.77 2.83 2.89 2.96 3.02 3.09 3.16
0.80% 2.59 2.64 2.69 2.75 2.80 2.86 2.92 2.98 3.05 3.12 3.19
0.90% 2.62 2.67 2.72 2.77 2.83 2.89 2.95 3.01 3.08 3.15 3.22


















2.76 0.20% 0.29% 0.35% 0.40% 0.45% 0.50% 0.55% 0.60% 0.65% 0.70% 0.75%
-0.35% 2.80 2.78 2.76 2.75 2.74 2.73 2.71 2.70 2.69 2.68 2.66
-0.28% 2.78 2.76 2.74 2.73 2.72 2.71 2.69 2.68 2.67 2.66 2.65
0.00% 2.70 2.68 2.66 2.65 2.64 2.63 2.62 2.61 2.60 2.58 2.57
0.10% 2.67 2.65 2.64 2.63 2.61 2.60 2.59 2.58 2.57 2.56 2.55
0.30% 2.62 2.60 2.58 2.57 2.56 2.55 2.54 2.53 2.52 2.51 2.50
0.50% 2.56 2.54 2.53 2.52 2.51 2.50 2.49 2.48 2.47 2.46 2.45
0.70% 2.51 2.49 2.48 2.47 2.46 2.45 2.44 2.43 2.42 2.41 2.40
1.00% 2.44 2.42 2.41 2.40 2.39 2.38 2.37 2.36 2.35 2.34 2.33
1.50% 2.31 2.30 2.29 2.28 2.27 2.26 2.25 2.24 2.23 2.22 2.21
1.70% 2.27 2.25 2.24 2.23 2.22 2.21 2.21 2.20 2.19 2.18 2.17
2.00% 2.20 2.18 2.17 2.16 2.16 2.15 2.14 2.13 2.12 2.11 2.11






















































































Source: Team estimates 
 
 
0% ≤ Hold < 10%
Sell < -10%
-10% ≤ Reduce < 0%
10% ≤ Buy < 20%













































9. A Regulation Approach Based on TOTEX 
 
Under the current regulatory approach, ERSE set separate allowances either for Operational Expenditure  
(OPEX) or Capital Expenditure (CAPEX), and applies a price-cap mechanism to OPEX. As for CAPEX, it is 
partially reimbursed through the rate of return REN receives on its RAB as well as through the recovery of 
amortizations. 
REN’s core remuneration in both electricity and NG segments, accounting for 34% and 41% of 2017 revenues 
respectively (Figure 30 & 31), comes from the RAB remuneration, encouraging the company to prefer CAPEX 
rather than OPEX, even when the total cost can be reduced by choosing an OPEX solution, causing a capital 
expenditure bias. 
Since CAPEX allows growth in RAB and to earn a return on this expenditure, it may incent the company to 
manipulate revenues by choosing CAPEX solutions such as asset replacement instead of OPEX solutions, such 
as extending the life of an asset through maintenance work, in order to maximize revenues. Moreover, this 
current approach has been encouraging REN for non-rational decisions, such as not applying for EU Funds for 
infrastructure investments as well as holding underperforming assets just because they account for RAB 
purposes. In the last six years REN’S CAPEX surpassed OPEX, representing on average 62% of the total costs, 
or TOTEX (defined as the sum of CAPEX and OPEX)- Figure 32. 
 
The move to a Total Expenditure framework (TOTEX) is likely to mitigate such CAPEX bias. This approach aims 
to ensure more rational and efficient use of capital as well as to find more innovative solutions, through an 
identical treatment of all costs. By doing so, neither OPEX nor CAPEX are treated more favorably. The outcome 
is that rather than replace the asset and consequently add its value to the RAB, different and possibly cheaper 
ways can be adopted by the company in order to achieve required outcomes. 
Amongst REN’s peers, National Grid in UK and Snam and Terna in Italy, by 2008 and 2016 respectively, have 
already switched their regulatory models to a TOTEX framework, exactly to address the CAPEX bias issue. They 
no longer set distinct allowances for OPEX and CAPEX and now set a single allowance for the total expenditure. 
As a consequence, the bias has been removed since all costs, whatever their nature, now face the same incentive 
rate and companies now look at the total expenditure requirement of each decision, considering its impact on 
the outcome. 
The expectations are for the tendency to expand this method of regulation to other countries. Although there 
is no sign that ERSE will change the regulatory framework, I will perform some analysis on how the current 
regulatory approach would need to be adjusted to accommodate the switch to TOTEX as well as the impact of 
an implementation of such regulatory framework. 
 
Key Elements of a TOTEX Framework Implementation 
 Common treatment of all costs- The distinction between OPEX and CAPEX would be removed since 
different costs benchmarking may encourage the company to make biased choices between one cost 
solution or another. Thus, the use of a TOTEX benchmarking is required to avoid that bias and so 
there is only one allowance for total cost, without specifying the maximum allowances of OPEX and 
CAPEX individually. 
 Recovery of allowed expenditure- A fixed proportion of the TOTEX (TOTEX capitalisation rate), 
whether CAPEX or OPEX, is included in the RAB and then it will earn a rate of return (RoR) as well 
as an amortization allowance. What's left on TOTEX in then recovered, replacing the actual revenue 
from OPEX. 
 Single incentive mechanism- A common incentive rate is set for total expenditure, replacing the 
distinct OPEX and CAPEX incentive mechanisms. Such incentive rate will be applied to the variations 
between the allowed and the incurred total expenditure. The aim is to avoid a company’s strategy to 
inflate the RAB since under this mechanism, pump up the RAB would need more spending in total 
than the allowed, and so it would be penalised by the new TOTEX incentive mechanism. 
 
Although this move brings a lot of benefits, there are likely to be potential disadvantages such as the high learning 
costs this approach may come with, its implementation may be complex and difficult for the regulator and there 
are few examples of TOTEX being used internationally. 
In order to include TOTEX’s key elements on REN’s current regulatory approach, some assumptions need to be 
done. They are as follows: 
 
 TOTEX allowance- TOTEX would be defined at the beginning of each regulatory period of three years, 
and will increase from one year to the following on a price-cap base, based on the previous level of 
expenditure adjusted by a GDPI methodology and an efficiency factor.  
TOTEX = TOTEXt-1 x (1+GDPI-1.5%) 
 Additions to the RAB- A 60% of TOTEX capitalisation rate is assumed following Ofgem (the first 
economic regulator addressing TOTEX Framework) that allowed companies to only adopt 
capitalisation rates ranging between 60% and 80% and by looking to REN’s historical proportion of 
CAPEX of around 60%. A low parameter is assumed to ensure financeability since a high percentage of 
TOTEX being capitalised may result in cash insufficiency in the short term to meet operational needs 
and debt requirements due to the reduced percentage of TOTEX recovered.  
That percentage of TOTEX will then be added to the RAB and depreciated as it is now. It will also earn 
the base RoR set by ERSE. The remainder TOTEX (1- capitalisation rate applied to TOTEX) will be 
recovered, which would be equal to the expected level of OPEX. 
 Incentive mechanisms- It is assumed the same 63% Ofgem’s incentive rate. TOTEX incurred will be 
compared to allowed TOTEX each year and any variation will be multiplied by the incentive rate, as it 
were an allowance for total cost. 
 
Impact on REN’s Valuation 
The implementation of a TOTEX framework on REN accounts for a drop of €-0.21/sh, changing the price target 
for the company from the €2.76/sh FCFF to €2.55/sh, slightly above the current price (€2.43) and still 
supporting the positive outlook for REN (+6% Upside potential).  
Figure 30: Electricity Revenues 
Breakdown 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Figure 31: NG Revenues Breakdown 
 
Source: Team estimates 
 
Figure 32: TOTEX Breakdown (€M) 
 









Table 12: REN’s Price Target under 
TOTEX Approach 





Major changes occurred in REN’s core remuneration (return on RAB) as well as in the remuneration that REN 
receives from its TOTEX under the new approach, which is now replacing the revenues received by REN on its 
OPEX. The variation in these revenues drivers accounts for -3.3% and -4.5% on average 2017F-23F 
respectively, comparing to previous framework’s figures, causing REN´s operating results and FCFF to go down 
by 3.8% and 2.2% on average, respectively. (Appendix 28) 
Despite the higher transfers to RAB (+15.8% 2017F-23F average) that allowed recovery of amortizations to 
increase +1.2% on average comparing to previous approach, REN no longer receives a premium on its 
electricity RoR since there is no more an incentive mechanism on CAPEX, hindering the growth in RAB´s 
remuneration. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis for Assumptions 
The base case assumes a 60% capitalisation rate, 63% incentive rate and a 1.5% efficiency factor. However, 
alternative scenarios were tested. 
The capitalisation rate may vary between companies. Performing sensitivity analysis to the capitalisation rate 
by ranging it between the allowed 60% and 80% does not yield a significant change in the €2.55 price target 
(under TOTEX Approach). However, in a scenario where the capitalisation rate is set at 80% it will result in a 
downside potential since a too high capitalisation rate may create a short term financeability problem.  Also, 
changes in the incentive rate almost does not change the price target. 
 
Table 13: Sensitivity analysis for the Capitalisation Rate and Incentive Rate 
 
 
As for the efficiency factor, only in a scenario where the regulator sets the parameter above 3.5% generates a 
downside potential. 
 
Table 14: Sensitivity analysis for the Efficiency Factor 
 
 
TOTEX- The Right Path towards Efficiency 
With the new regulatory approach, the company has now more freedom to achieve required outcomes in the 
most efficient ways from both regulator and company’s perspective, as there are no longer separate incentive 
mechanisms for OPEX and CAPEX. Now the revenues are computed according to the achieved outputs and so it 
would give the company more encouragement for cost reduction as well as an unbiased view on whether it 
should incur on OPEX or CAPEX solutions, looking instead for the most efficient solution, resulting in greater 
incentives thus greater revenues.  The CAPEX bias that could occur under the previous framework has been 
addressed under the TOTEX approach, as can be seen in the following table. 
 
Table 15: Potential sources of CAPEX bias & Mitigation through a TOTEX Framework 
 
Source: Team estimates 
Price 
Target
2,55 60% 62% 64% 66% 68% 70% 72% 74% 76% 78% 80%
51% 2,55 2,54 2,52 2,51 2,50 2,49 2,47 2,46 2,45 2,44 2,42
54% 2,55 2,54 2,53 2,51 2,50 2,49 2,47 2,46 2,45 2,44 2,42
57% 2,55 2,54 2,53 2,51 2,50 2,49 2,48 2,46 2,45 2,44 2,43
60% 2,55 2,54 2,53 2,52 2,50 2,49 2,48 2,46 2,45 2,44 2,43
63% 2,55 2,54 2,53 2,52 2,50 2,49 2,48 2,47 2,45 2,44 2,43
66% 2,56 2,54 2,53 2,52 2,51 2,49 2,48 2,47 2,45 2,44 2,43
69% 2,56 2,54 2,53 2,52 2,51 2,49 2,48 2,47 2,46 2,44 2,43
72% 2,56 2,55 2,53 2,52 2,51 2,49 2,48 2,47 2,46 2,44 2,43
75% 2,56 2,55 2,53 2,52 2,51 2,50 2,48 2,47 2,46 2,45 2,43











1% 1,5% 2% 2,5% 3% 3,5% 4,0% 4,5% 5,0%
Price Target 2,58 2,55 2,53 2,50 2,48 2,45 2,43 2,40 2,38
Upside Potential 6,96% 5,79% 4,62% 3,46% 2,30% 1,13% -0,03% -1,18% -2,34%
Reccomendation HOLD HOLD HOLD HOLD HOLD HOLD REDUCE REDUCE REDUCE
Efficiency factor
CAPEX bias driver Mitigation
Separate regulatory incentives for OPEX and CAPEX
The distinct incentive mechanisms for OPEX and CAPEX 
could provide different preferences to outperform the 
regulatory allowances, such as choosing one cost over 
another.
Introduction of a single incentive mechanism applied to the total 
cost in order to ensure a higher TOTEX outperformance.
Separate benchmarking for OPEX and CAPEX
The benchmarking applied by the regulator is stronger for 
OPEX due to the information asymmetry on CAPEX, 
facilitating the company to get their plans for investment 
approved.
Introduction of a TOTEX benchmarking simply with a total cost 
allowance that the company may try to outperform.
Incentive to grow the RAB
Due to the allowed remuneration on RAB, the company 
may face an incentive to choose CAPEX in order to grow 
the RAB and therefore to earn a return on that.
The introduction of a single TOTEX allowance and a capitalisation 
rate turns RAB only dependent on the overall TOTEX as well as on 
the TOTEX capitalisation rate. Thus, for RAB to increase from a 













Appendix 1: Statement of Financial Position (REN)  
 
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 4,252,682 4,087,871 4,726,539 4,621,933 4,522,332 4,422,118 4,343,257 4,273,732 4,204,960 -2%
Property, plant and equipment 695 578 4,514 4,728 4,942 5,156 5,370 5,584 5,798 4%
Goodwill 3,774 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397 3,397 0%
Intangible assets 3,869,085 3,825,712 4,263,344 4,162,512 4,061,059 3,958,983 3,878,254 3,806,846 3,736,184 -2%
Investments in associates and joint ventures 14,588 14,657 185,410 186,881 188,355 189,833 191,317 192,808 194,306 1%
Available-for-sale financial assets 154,862 150,118 150,123 150,123 150,123 150,123 150,123 150,123 150,123 0%
Derivative financial instruments 10,157 20,425 20,425 20,425 20,425 20,425 20,425 20,425 20,425 0%
Other financial assets 7 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 0%
Trade and other receivables 133,676 10,145 19,342 13,883 14,046 14,217 14,387 14,565 14,743 -4%
Deferred tax assets 65,838 62,825 79,970 79,970 79,970 79,970 79,970 79,970 79,970 0%
CURRENT ASSETS 337,271 461,954 454,202 445,962 465,881 541,349 606,542 658,561 692,577 7%
Inventories 2,985 1,028 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 2,504 0%
Trade and other receivables 263,766 448,826 339,162 262,945 261,445 259,403 257,493 256,266 255,731 -5%
Available for sale Financial Assets 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Current income tax recoverable 5,358 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Derivative financial instruments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Other financial assets 1,510 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 1,317 0%
Cash and cash equivalents 63,652 10,780 111,219 179,196 200,615 278,125 345,228 398,474 433,025 25%
TOTAL ASSETS 4,589,953 4,549,825 5,180,740 5,067,895 4,988,213 4,963,467 4,949,799 4,932,292 4,897,537 -1%
SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY 1,161,289 1,159,217 1,459,860 1,477,093 1,494,834 1,538,846 1,580,903 1,621,041 1,653,212 2%
Share capital 534,000 534,000 667,191 667,191 667,191 667,191 667,191 667,191 667,191 0%
Own shares (10,728.0) (10,728.0) (10,728.0) (10,728.0) (10,728.0) (10,728.0) (10,728.0) (10,728.0) (10,728.0) 0%
Reserves 325,619 319,204 318,763 318,763 318,763 318,763 318,763 318,763 318,763 0%
Retained earnings 196,253 216,527 226,060 254,369 271,602 286,507 327,613 366,690 403,775 10%
Issue Premium 0 0 116,809 116,809 116,809 116,809 116,809 116,809 116,809 0%
Other changes in Equity 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 0%
Net profit for the year 116,115 100,183 141,735 130,660 131,167 160,273 161,225 162,286 157,372 2%
NON CURRENT LIABILITIES 2,455,086 2,833,735 3,158,342 3,234,088 2,824,155 3,128,645 3,042,070 2,204,391 2,768,226 -2%
Borrowings 1,891,245 2,298,543 2,564,214 2,656,224 2,255,495 2,568,913 2,490,933 1,661,448 2,233,096 -2%
Liability for retirement benefits and others 129,217 125,673 126,119 126,119 126,119 126,119 126,119 126,119 126,119 0%
Derivative financial instruments 8,426 12,212 12,212 12,212 12,212 12,212 12,212 12,212 12,212 0%
Provisions 5,717 6,154 7,526 7,526 7,526 7,526 7,526 7,526 7,526 0%
Trade and other payables 332,232 318,126 324,683 308,418 299,215 290,287 281,692 273,499 265,685 -3%
Deferred tax liabilities 88,249 73,027 123,588 123,588 123,588 123,588 123,588 123,588 123,588 0%
CURRENT LIABILITIES 973,579 556,873 562,538 356,714 669,223 295,976 326,827 1,106,860 476,098 -3%
Borrowings 650,755 216,594 269,358 85,991 402,603 34,086 59,797 839,439 211,041 -4%
Provisions 1,171 801 801 801 801 801 801 801 801 0%
Trade and other payables 315,735 311,539 291,317 268,859 264,756 260,026 265,166 265,557 263,193 -2%
Income tax payable 0 26,875 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Derivative financial instruments 5,918 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 1,063 0%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 3,428,664 3,390,608 3,720,880 3,590,802 3,493,379 3,424,621 3,368,897 3,311,251 3,244,325 -2%
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 4,589,953 4,549,825 5,180,740 5,067,895 4,988,213 4,963,467 4,949,799 4,932,292 4,897,537 -1%
CAGR 17F-
23F
2022F2017F                                   2018F 2020FCONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET €'000 2021F 2023F2019F20162015
NON-CURRENT ASSETS 92.7% 89.8% 91.2% 91.2% 90.7% 89.1% 87.7% 86.6% 85.9%
Property, plant and equipment 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Goodwill 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Intangible assets 84.3% 84.1% 82.3% 82.1% 81.4% 79.8% 78.4% 77.2% 76.3%
Investments in associates and joint ventures 0.3% 0.3% 3.6% 3.7% 3.8% 3.8% 3.9% 3.9% 4.0%
Available-for-sale financial assets 3.4% 3.3% 2.9% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.0% 3.1%
Derivative financial instruments 0.2% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
Other financial assets 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Trade and other receivables 2.9% 0.2% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Deferred tax assets 1.4% 1.4% 1.5% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6%
CURRENT ASSETS 7.3% 10.2% 8.8% 8.8% 9.3% 10.9% 12.3% 13.4% 14.1%
Inventories 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Trade and other receivables 5.7% 9.9% 6.5% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2%
Available for sale Financial Assets 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Current income tax recoverable 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Derivative financial instruments 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Other financial assets 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Cash and cash equivalents 1.4% 0.2% 2.1% 3.5% 4.0% 5.6% 7.0% 8.1% 8.8%
TOTAL ASSETS 100.0% 100.0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
SHAREHOLDERS EQUITY 25.3% 25.5% 28.2% 29.1% 30.0% 31.0% 31.9% 32.9% 33.8%
Share capital 11.6% 11.7% 12.9% 13.2% 13.4% 13.4% 13.5% 13.5% 13.6%
Own shares -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2% -0.2%
Reserves 7.1% 7.0% 6.2% 6.3% 6.4% 6.4% 6.4% 6.5% 6.5%
Retained earnings 4.3% 4.8% 4.4% 5.0% 5.4% 5.8% 6.6% 7.4% 8.2%
Issue Premium 0.0% 0.0% 2.3% 2.3% 2.3% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4%
Other changes in Equity 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Net profit for the year 2.5% 2.2% 2.7% 2.6% 2.6% 3.2% 3.3% 3.3% 3.2%
NON CURRENT LIABILITIES 53.5% 62.3% 61.0% 63.8% 56.6% 63.0% 61.5% 44.7% 56.5%
Borrowings 41.2% 50.5% 49.5% 52.4% 45.2% 51.8% 50.3% 33.7% 45.6%
Liability for retirement benefits and others 2.8% 2.8% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.6%
Derivative financial instruments 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Provisions 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Trade and other payables 7.2% 7.0% 6.3% 6.1% 6.0% 5.8% 5.7% 5.5% 5.4%
Deferred tax liabilities 1.9% 1.6% 2.4% 2.4% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
CURRENT LIABILITIES 21.2% 12.2% 10.9% 7.0% 13.4% 6.0% 6.6% 22.4% 9.7%
Borrowings 14.2% 4.8% 5.2% 1.7% 8.1% 0.7% 1.2% 17.0% 4.3%
Provisions 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Trade and other payables 6.9% 6.8% 5.6% 5.3% 5.3% 5.2% 5.4% 5.4% 5.4%
Income tax payable 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Derivative financial instruments 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
TOTAL LIABILITIES 74.7% 74.5% 71.8% 70.9% 70.0% 69.0% 68.1% 67.1% 66.2%
TOTAL EQUITY AND LIABILITIES 100.0% 100.0% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
2017F                              2018F 2019F 2022F2021F























Sales 552 569 3,249 3,249 3,249 3,249 3,249 3,249 3,249 0%
Services rendered 536,544 544,672 588,743 560,619 557,187 552,481 548,085 545,310 544,172 -1%
Revenue from construction of concession assets 240,002 171,247 138,000 125,000 119,500 113,500 129,500 133,500 130,000 -1%
Gains from associates and joint ventures 768 1,314 8,813 8,963 9,116 9,272 9,590 9,922 10,266 3%
Other operating income 41,279 21,649 23,927 23,343 22,780 22,236 21,713 21,207 20,720 -2%
Operating income 819,144 739,452 762,732 721,174 711,832 700,738 712,136 713,188 708,407 -1%
Cost of goods sold (562.0) (450.0) (1,762.4) (1,762.4) (1,762.4) (1,762.4) (1,762.4) (1,762.4) (1,762.4) 0%
Cost with construction of concession assets (222,602.0) (155,217.0) (122,816.2) (111,346.3) (106,490.3) (101,192.8) (115,319.4) (118,851.0) (115,760.8) -1%
External supplies and services (42,636.0) (44,328.0) (54,469.9) (51,919.4) (51,717.5) (51,415.9) (51,139.1) (50,997.7) (50,988.9) -1%
Personnel costs (51,673.0) (49,583.0) (54,120.1) (51,534.9) (51,219.6) (50,787.2) (50,383.3) (50,128.5) (50,024.0) -1%
Depreciation and amortizations (209,303.0) (214,761.0) (228,340.6) (225,831.7) (220,952.5) (215,576.6) (210,229.0) (204,908.0) (200,661.6) -2%
Provisions 302 (516.0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Impairment of trade receivables (683.0) (258.0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Other expenses (11,893.0) (12,595.0) (15,755.0) (15,755.0) (15,755.0) (15,755.0) (15,755.0) (15,755.0) (15,755.0) 0%
Operating costs (539,049.0) (477,708.0) (477,264.2) (458,149.7) (447,897.3) (436,489.9) (444,588.1) (442,402.6) (434,952.7) -2%
Operating results 280,095 261,743 285,468 263,025 263,935 264,248 267,548 270,785 273,454 -1%
Financial costs (110,503.0) (91,182.0) (78,569.7) (66,794.7) (67,876.3) (62,069.1) (63,980.0) (65,667.9) (75,510.2) -1%
Financial income 6,339 5,291 9,485 9,485 9,485 9,485 9,485 9,485 9,485 0%
Investment income - dividends 5,592 5,550 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 0%
Financial results (98,572.0) (80,341.0) (49,101.7) (37,326.7) (38,408.3) (32,601.1) (34,512.0) (36,199.9) (46,042.2) -1%
Profit before income tax 181,523 181,403 236,366 225,698 225,526 231,647 233,036 234,585 227,412 -1%
Income tax expense (39,963.0) (55,282.0) (68,833.0) (69,499.9) (69,445.8) (71,373.9) (71,811.5) (72,299.4) (70,039.7) 0%
Energy sector extraordinary contribution (ESEC) (25,445.0) (25,938.0) (25,798.0) (25,538.4) (24,913.9) 0 0 0 0 -100%
NET PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 116,115 100,183 141,735 130,660 131,167 160,273 161,225 162,286 157,372 2%
ATTRIBUTABLE TO: n.a.
Shareholders of the Company 116,115 100,183 141,735 130,660 131,167 160,273 161,225 162,286 157,372 2%
Non-controlling interests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Consolidated profit for the year 116,115 100,183 141,735 130,660 131,167 160,273 161,225 162,286 157,372 2%
Earnings per share (expressed in € per share) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2%
CAGR 17F-
23F
2023F2022F2017F             2018F 2019F 2020F 2021FCONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT €'000 2015 2016
Sales 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Services rendered 66% 74% 77% 78% 78% 79% 77% 76% 77%
Revenue from construction of concession assets 29% 23% 18% 17% 17% 16% 18% 19% 18%
Gains from associates and joint ventures 0% 0% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Other operating income 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Operating income 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Cost of goods sold 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Cost with construction of concession assets -27% -21% -16% -15% -15% -14% -16% -17% -16%
External supplies and services -5% -6% -7% -7% -7% -7% -7% -7% -7%
Personnel costs -6% -7% -7% -7% -7% -7% -7% -7% -7%
Depreciation and amortizations -26% -29% -30% -31% -31% -31% -30% -29% -28%
Provisions 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Impairment of trade receivables 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Other expenses -1% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2%
Operating costs -66% -65% -63% -64% -63% -62% -62% -62% -61%
Operating results 34% 35% 37% 36% 37% 38% 38% 38% 39%
Financial costs -13% -12% -10% -9% -10% -9% -9% -9% -11%
Financial income 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1% 1%
Investment income - dividends 1% 1% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Financial results -12% -11% -6% -5% -5% -5% -5% -5% -6%
Profit before income tax 22% 25% 31% 31% 32% 33% 33% 33% 32%
Income tax expense -5% -7% -9% -10% -10% -10% -10% -10% -10%
Energy sector extraordinary contribution (ESEC) -3% -4% -3% -4% -3% 0% 0% 0% 0%
NET PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 14% 14% 19% 18% 18% 23% 23% 23% 22%
ATTRIBUTABLE TO: 0% 0%
Shareholders of the Company 14% 14% 19% 18% 18% 23% 23% 23% 22%
Non-controlling interests 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Consolidated profit for the year 14% 14% 19% 18% 18% 23% 23% 23% 22%
2021F 2022F 2023F2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F









CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS 503,603 427,809 369,443 387,390 394,661 386,719 383,991 -4%
Operating Results 285,468 263,025 263,935 264,248 267,548 270,785 273,454 -1%
Depreciations & Amortizations 228,341 225,832 220,952 215,577 210,229 204,908 200,662 -2%
Gains/Losses in Associates and J&V (8,813.0) (8,963.0) (9,116.0) (9,272.1) (9,590.4) (9,921.5) (10,265.9) 3%
Provisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Impairments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Changes in NWC 61,091 53,759.0 -2,603 -2,689 7,051 1,618 -1,828 n.a.
Changes in Non Current Operational Assets (9,197.3) 5,459.2 (163.0) (171.0) (170.2) (178.1) (177.3) -48%
Changes in Non Current Payables 7,928.9 (16,264.6) (9,202.9) (8,928.4) (8,595.4) (8,193.0) (7,813.1) n.a.
Income Tax (94,631.0) (95,038.3) (94,359.8) (71,373.9) (71,811.5) (72,299.4) (70,039.7) -5%
Changes in Deffered tax Assets (17,145.0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Changes in Deffered tax Liablities 50,561 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
CASH FLOW FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES 408,700 (262,092.6) (255,934.4) (223,944.3) (225,932.8) (228,173.5) (247,976.2) n.a.
Net Interest Expense (69,084.7) (57,309.7) (58,391.3) (52,584.1) (54,495.0) (56,182.9) (66,025.2) -1%
Dividends Paid (90,650.3) (113,426.0) (113,426.0) (116,261.6) (119,168.2) (122,147.4) (125,201.1) 6%
Share Capital Increase 133,191 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Issue Premium 116,809 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Changes in Debt 318,435 (91,356.8) (84,117.1) (55,098.5) (52,269.6) (49,843.1) (56,750.0) n.a.
CASH FLOW FROM INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES (811,864.0) (97,739.1) (92,089.3) (85,936.4) (101,624.6) (105,300.4) (101,463.2) -29%
Concession Assets (138,000.0) (125,000.0) (119,500.0) (113,500.0) (129,500.0) (133,500.0) (130,000.0) -1%
Property Plant and Equiment (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) 0%
Dividends Received (Available for Sale Assets) 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 19,983 0%
Acquisiton REN PORTGAS (531,693.0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Acquisition Electrogas (169,285.0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Dividends Electrogas 7,345 7,492 7,642 7,795 8,106 8,431 8,768 3%
Cash and cash equivalents in the beginning of the period 10,780 111,219 179,196 200,615 278,125 345,228 398,474 83%
NET CHANGES IN CASH 100,439 67,977 21,419 77,509 67,103 53,245 34,552 -16%
Cash and Cash Equivalents in the end of the period 111,219 179,196 200,615 278,125 345,228 398,474 433,025 25%
CAGR 17F-23F2022F 2023F2017FCash Flow Statement (000' Euros) 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
57% 61% 71% 68% 68% 70% 71%
45% 53% 60% 56% 53% 53% 52%
-2% -2% -2% -2% -2% -3% -3%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
12% 13% -1% -1% 2% 0% 0%
-2% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
2% -4% -2% -2% -2% -2% -2%
-19% -22% -26% -18% -18% -19% -18%
-3% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
10% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
81% -61% -69% -58% -57% -59% -65%
-14% -13% -16% -14% -14% -15% -17%
-18% -27% -31% -30% -30% -32% -33%
26% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
23% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
63% -21% -23% -14% -13% -13% -15%
-161% -23% -25% -22% -26% -27% -26%
-27% -29% -32% -29% -33% -35% -34%
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
-106% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
-34% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
2% 26% 49% 52% 70% 89% 104%
20% 16% 6% 20% 17% 14% 9%
22% 42% 54% 72% 87% 103% 113%
Cash and cash equivalents in the beginning of the period
NET CHANGES IN CASH
Cash and cash equivalents in the end of the period
Property Plant and Equiment






CASH FLOW FROM INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES
Concession Assets




Changes in Non Current Operational Assets
Changes in Non Current Payables
Income Tax
Changes in Deffered tax Assets
Changes in Deffered tax Liablities
Changes in NWC
2022F 2023FCommon-Size Cash Flow Statements (%CFO)
Operating Results
2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS
Depreciations & Amortizations





Appendix 4: Key Financial Ratios 
  
Source: Company data & Team estimates 
Appendix 5: Statement of Financial Position Assumptions 
 
Key Financial Ratios units 2014 2015 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
PROFITABILITY RATIOS
EBITDA Margin % 85.28% 84.50% 83.86% 82.24% 81.98% 81.85% 81.70% 81.98% 82.04% 81.95%
EBITDA Margin Adj. % 66.87% 59.75% 64.44% 67.36% 68.05% 68.37% 68.72% 67.35% 66.95% 67.17%
EBIT Margin % 51.10% 48.36% 46.06% 45.69% 44.99% 45.40% 45.82% 46.70% 47.46% 48.00%
EBIT Margin Adj. % 40.07% 34.19% 35.40% 37.43% 37.35% 37.93% 38.54% 38.36% 38.73% 39.34%
Net Profit Margin % 19.02% 20.05% 17.63% 22.69% 21.51% 21.81% 26.58% 26.99% 27.35% 25.97%
Net Profit Margin Adj. % 14.92% 14.18% 13.55% 18.58% 17.86% 18.22% 22.36% 22.17% 22.32% 21.29%
NPM (Excluding ESEC) Adj. % 18.23% 17.28% 17.06% 21.96% 21.33% 21.65% 22.36% 22.17% 22.32% 21.29%
ROA % 2.29% 2.53% 2.20% 2.74% 2.59% 2.65% 3.21% 3.24% 3.28% 3.13%
ROE % 9.93% 10.00% 8.64% 9.71% 8.89% 8.84% 10.37% 10.17% 9.99% 9.30%
ROCE % 7.73% 7.75% 6.56% 6.18% 5.83% 6.37% 5.89% 6.02% 7.35% 6.42%
EFFICIENCY RATIOS
Cash Opex/RAB % 6.47% 8.02% 6.78% 4.93% 4.72% 4.72% 4.71% 5.18% 5.38% 5.41%
Receivable turnover times 0.96 1.14 1.27 1.45 1.80 2.03 2.03 2.03 2.03 2.03
Days Sales Outstanding (DSO) days 381.55 320.56 286.65 252.01 202.53 179.48 179.95 180.20 180.19 180.11
Inventory turnover times 0.44 0.24 0.22 1.00 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.70
Days Inventory Outstanding (DIO) days 832.63 1547.03 1627.49 365.74 518.59 518.59 518.59 518.59 518.59 518.59
Payables turnover times 0.19 0.34 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31
Days payable outstanding (DPO) days 1929.94 1086.15 1165.87 1317.99 1315.71 1305.35 1320.59 1194.18 1158.76 1160.49
Operating Cycle days 1214.18 1867.59 1914.15 617.76 721.12 698.06 698.54 698.79 698.78 698.70
Cash cycle conversion (CCC) days -715.76 781.44 748.28 -700.24 -594.59 -607.28 -622.06 -495.39 -459.98 -461.79
Fixed asset turnover times 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.15
Total asset turnover times 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11
LIQUIDITY RATIOS
Current Ratio (x) times 0.65 0.35 0.83 0.81 1.25 0.70 1.82 1.85 0.60 1.45
Quick Ratio (x) times 0.65 0.34 0.83 0.80 1.24 0.70 1.81 1.84 0.60 1.44
Cash Ratio (x) times 0.11 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.50 0.30 0.93 1.04 0.36 0.89
Interest Coverage Ratio times 2.30 2.53 2.87 3.63 3.55 3.55 3.73 3.70 3.68 3.11
CAPITAL STRUCTURE
Total Debt to Total Equity times 2.29 2.19 2.17 1.94 1.86 1.78 1.69 1.61 1.54 1.48
Total Debt to Total Capital times 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.66 0.65 0.64 0.63 0.62 0.61 0.60
Total Debt to Total Assets times 0.53 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.51 0.50
Long-Term Debt to Equity times 1.75 2.10 1.94 1.85 1.89 1.60 1.76 1.66 1.11 1.44
Long-Term Debt to Total Capital times 0.55 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.66 0.58 0.65 0.64 0.44 0.58
Long-Term Debt to Assets times 0.44 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.55 0.48 0.54 0.53 0.36 0.48
Financial Leverage times 4.34 3.95 3.92 3.55 3.43 3.34 3.23 3.13 3.05 2.97
Net Debt/ EBITDA times 4.93 5.06 5.26 5.30 5.12 4.95 4.73 4.51 4.32 4.16
Payout and Cash Flow Ratios
Payout Ratio (Dividend/Net income) % 0.74 0.81 0.78 0.90 0.80 0.86 0.88 0.75 0.76 0.77
Payout Ratio (Dividend/FCFE) % n.a n.a n.a n.a 0.73 0.84 0.69 0.72 0.76 0.83
Earnings Quality (CFO/(Net 
Income+D&A+ΔNWC))
times n.a n.a n.a 1.63 1.44 1.07 1.05 1.11 1.09 1.11
*Adj. (Adjusted): Takes into account all the operating income. In the remaining cases "Revenue from Construction Assets" is not accounted (Non-Cash Revenue).
We are assuming that from 2017 onwards are zero, given its unpredictability feature. The values of the tariff 
deviations on 2016 are fully recovered until 2018. 
23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% 23% Same relationship as of 2016 between Non Current REN PORTGAS,SA receivables and its Services Rendered
55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% 55% Same relationship as of 2016 betwen REN Portgas Inventories and its Sales
42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% 42% Average relationship (2012-2016) between current Trade Receivables and Services Rendered
We are assuming that from 2017 onwards are zero, given its unpredictability feature. The values of the tariff 
deviations on 2016 are fully recovered until 2018. 
35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% 35% Same relationship as of 2017F  between Current REN PORTGAS,SA receivables and its Services Rendered








0 0 0 0 0 0 Same value as 2017F
Appendix 19
78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78%
Based on the realtionship between non current Prepaid interest and the total Prepaid interest of that year, the 
amount of prepaid interest is to be amortized over the years and results of the refinancing of bonds issues, as 
stated in REN'S annual report of 2016
5,22% 5,22% 5,22% 5,22% 5,22% 5,22% 5,22% Average relationship (2013-2016) between Other Creditors (Non Current) and Services Rendered
Trade and Other Payables REN PORTGAS,SA 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% 39% Same relationship as of 2016 between REN PORTGAS,SA Trade and other Payables and its Services Rendered
-3,6% -3,6% -3,6% -3,6% -3,6% -3,6% -3,6% Average YoY change between 2012 and 2016
Appendix 19
1,12% 1,12% 1,12% 1,12% 1,12% 1,12% 1,12% Same Percentage as 2016  of total Bonds, Bank Borrowings, Commercial Paper and Finacial Leases
22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Based on the realtionship between current Prepaid interest and the total Prepaid interest of that year, the 
amount of prepaid interest is to be amortized over the years and results of the refinancing of bonds issues, as 
stated in REN'S annual report of 2016
24,91% 24,91% 24,91% 24,91% 24,91% 24,91% 24,91% Median value (2012-2016) of the relationship between Current Suppliers and Services Rendered
8,76% 8,76% 8,76% 8,76% 8,76% 8,76% 8,76% Median value (2012-2016) of the relationship between Other Creditors and Services Rendered
44,31% 44,31% 44,31% 44,31% 44,31% 44,31% 44,31%
Median (2012-2016) of the relationship between fixed asset Suppliers and Revenue from the Construction of 
Concession Assets
6,09% 6,09% 6,09% 6,09% 6,09% 6,09% 6,09% Average (2012-2016) relationship between Current and Non Current Grants Related to Assets
41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% 41% Same relationship between REN PORTGAS,SA current payables and its services rendered
-100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% The income tax is assumed to be fully paid in 2017F and to be 0 onwards
-100% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% The income tax is assumed to be fully paid in 2018F and to be 0 onwards
2021F 2022F 2023F Description
Inncome Tax Payable (REN PORTGAS, SA)
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET
Fixed Assets Suppliers
Grants Related to Assets (Deffered Income)




Trade and other payables 
Current Suppliers
Other Creditors
Grants Related to Assets (Deffered Income)
Current Liabilities
Borrowings








Trade and Other Receivables REN PORTGAS, SA
Current income tax recoverable (REN PORTGAS,SA)
REN PORTGAS, SA
Trade and other receivables 
Trade Receivables
Tariff Deviations
Trade and Other Receivables REN PORTGAS, SA
Current Assets
Inventories
BALENCE SHEET ASSUMPTIONS 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F




Appendix 6: Income Statement Assumptions 
 
From 2017F onwards, we are assuming that the average RAB at YE will be equal to: Average RABt= Av. RABt-1 
+ Transfers to RABt - Amortizations t. For each segment (Electricity; Natural Gas; REN Portgas). Transfers to 
RAB will equal additions to concession assets plus transfers from concession assets in progress to concession 
assets. CAPEX on year t will be splited into additions to concession Asstes and the other part will be assumed 
to stay in progress during one year, hence it will be added to the concession assets in year t+1. With this we 
are assuming that the total amount of CAPEX is already net of subsidies, meaning that it is fully paid by REN.  
(Appendix 8)
-4.45% -4.45% -4.45% -4.45% -4.45% -4.45% -4.45% YoY decrease based on the average of the last three years
0.00% 2.22% 2.51% 2.80% 3.09% 3.38% 3.67%
We have computed the implied foward rate between the 5Y and the 15Y Portuguese Yields and used that 
foward rate to estimate the 10Y PT yields in 2022. Moreover, we have assumed a linear relation between the 
2017 yields and our forecast for the 2022 yield. Aftermath, we are assuming a YoY growth of 29bps for the 10Y 
PT Yields. (Appendix 19)
3.43%
This is the average 10Y PT yield observed between October 2016 and September 2017, excluing the 1/12 
highest and lowest daily observations (as it is done by the regulator).  
3.07%
Daily average of the 10Y Portuguese Yields Between January 2017 to December 2017. For simplicity reasons, 
from this year onwards we will consider our estiamtions for the average yield at the end of each year for RoR 
computation, so the period of observation will be equal for Electricity
6.81% 6.40% 6.52% 6.63% 6.75% 6.86% 6.98%
6.06% 5.65% 5.77% 5.88% 6.00% 6.11% 6.23%
6.02% 6.02% 6.13% 6.25% 6.37% 6.48% 6.60%
Same as for electricity but with different collar parametrs, the floor is 5,40% and the CAP is 9%. The current 
Regulatory period started in 2016 and lasts until 2019. (There is no efficiency incentives on Capex, hence there 
no RoR Premium)
6.32% 6.32% 6.43% 6.55% 6.67% 6.78% 6.90%
Same as for electricity but with different collar parametrs, the floor is 5,70% and the CAP is 9,30%. The 
current Regulatory period started in 2016 and lasts until 2019. . (There is no efficiency incentives on Capex, 
hence there no RoR Premium)
0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% 0.36% Equal to the RoR of 2016
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 These values are assumed to be zero from 2017F onwards as it was stated by ERSE (Appendix xxx)
3.85% 12.50% 11.93% 7.72% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00%
YOY growth rates implicit in ERSE expectations for the value as stated in the document "Parâmetros de 
Regulação para o Periodo 2018 a 2020" and from 2020F onwards we assume the average YoY growth from 
2017F-2020F, given that incentive is expected to grow in the future due to the decrease in investment and a 
major base of fully amortized assets
Revenues from Opex t= Revenues from Opex t-1 *(1+ GDP deflator-Efficiency factor) (Appendix xxx)
1.20% 1.40% 1.40% 1.70% 1.70% 2.00% 2.00%
The values for 2017F to 2019F correspond to the forecasts from the European Comission, while the values for 
2020F and 2021F are the forecasts from the Conselho de Finanças Publicas the values for 2022F and 2023F are 
the target Inflation of the ECB
1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
Parameter Set by the Regulator (ERSE) for each regulatory period, the values for 2018F reflect the changes for 
the newest one (2018-2020)
3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% Parameter Set by the Regulator (ERSE) for the current regulatory period (2016-2019)
2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% Parameter Set by the Regulator (ERSE) for the current regulatory period (2016-2019)
70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% Average relationship between 2013 and 2016
30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% 30% Average relationship between 2013 and 2016
% REN PORTGAS in total  sunbsidies recognized in P&L 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% No subsidies related to REN PORTGAS ( value equal to its depreciations)
2% 2% 2% 2% 4% 4% 4% As held in Conference Call of 29 th january 2018 
54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 54% 54%
Same relationship as of 2016 between COGS and Sales, reflecting the impact of both Sales and COGS of REN 
PORTGAS
157.54% 157.54% 157.54% 157.54% 157.54% 157.54% 157.54% Average Relationship (2012-2016) between COGS and Sales
32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% 32% Same relationship as of 2016 between COGS and Sales
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% Average relationship (2012-2016) between ESS and Services Rendered
8.12% 8.12% 8.12% 8.12% 8.12% 8.12% 8.12% Average relationship (2012-2016) between ESS and Services Rendered
19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% 19% Same relationship as of 2016 between REN PORTGAS,SA ESS and its Services Rendered
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% Average relationship (2012-2016) between Personnel Costs and Services Rendered
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% Average relationship (2012-2016) between Personnel Costs and Services Rendered
9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% 9% Same relationship as of 2016 between REN PORTGAS,SA Personnel Costs and its Services Rendered
5.15% Average percentage of amortization compared with the value of concession assets
5.86% 5.86% 5.86% 5.86% 5.86% 5.86% 5.86% Average percentage of amortization (2012-2016) of electricity Segment  compared with its concession assets
4.96% 4.96% 4.96% 4.96% 4.96% 4.96% 4.96% Average percentage of amortization (2012-2016) of Natural Gas Segment  compared with its concession assets
3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% 3.7% Same relationship as 2016 of REN PORTGAS,SA amortizations compared with its concession assets 
2.38% 2.38% 2.38% 2.38% 2.38% 2.38% 2.38% Median value from 2012 to 2016 (% of Capex that goes directly to concession assets in the same year)




0 0 0 0 0 0 The acquisition will only occur once 
88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% Average from 2012 to 2016
88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% 88% Average from 2012 to 2016
93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% 93% Same relationship as of 2016 between REN PORTGAS,SA construction costs and revenue from construction
2.56% 2.80% 3.09% 3.38% 3.67% 3.96% 4.25%
REN's cost of financing is equal to the average yield ((yield t + yield t-1)/2) of the 10Y Portuguese Bonds minus 
2,82 bps, which is the spread between the yields of the January 2018 issues of Portuguese and REN's bonds. It 
is considered to be the cost of debt for the debt at floating rate. (Appendix 19)
2.70% 2.61% 35.39% 44.31% 43.17% 42.04% 46.83% Appendix 19
2.70% 2.61% 2.70% 2.65% 2.76% 2.87% 3.52%
0.85% 0.85% 0.85% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
The ESEC is set as 0,85% of the Regulated Asset Base or the concession assets (higher) excluding the value of 
LNG Terminal. The levy on REN Portgas is not included, it was agreed between REN and EDP at the purchase 
agreement that EDP will pay the levy until 2019. Additionally, we are assuming, as base case scenario, that the 
levy will cease on 2020.
% LNG Terminal in Total Concession Assets 19.00% 19.00% 19.00% 19.00% 19.00% 19.00% 19.00% Same Percentage that the one implict in the value to be paid in 2017F
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Same nominal value from 2017F onwards
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% Same nominal value from 2017F onwards
0.171 €                   0.171 €            0.171 €            0.175 €             0.180 €           0.184 €      0.189 €          
 Assumed as the Same value as the most recent years, as it is one of the main policies of REN (to keep a stable 
dividend policy) 
0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 3%
2022F 2023F Description
Average RAB
INCOME STATEMENT ASSUMPTIONS 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F
INCOME STATEMENT
Revenue and RAB Breakdown
REN Portgas RoR
Land RoR
Electricity RoR The RoR is set by the Regulator (ERSE) at the beginning of each regulatory period. The values will then adjust 
in accordance with the 10Y Yield variations (0,4% increase for each 1% increase in Yields). In the case of 
Electricity, there is a RoR with premium which is 0,75% higher than the Base RoR .The values for 2018F 
reflect the changes for the new regulatory period (2018-2020). The RoR have a Collar mechanism with a floor 





Rate of Remuneration (RoR)
10 Year Portuguese Bond Yield
Electricity
Natural Gas and REN PortGas




Natural gas REN PORTGAS, SA
Subsidies Recognition
% Electricity subsidies in total subsidies recognized in the P&L
% Natural Gas subsidies in total subsidies recognized in the P&L
Smoothing Differences (Natural Gas)













Cost of goods sold
Cost of goods sold
REN PORTGAS, SA Cost of Goods Sold
External supplies and services
External supplies and services
REN PORTGAS, SA External Supplies and Servies
Concession Assets
Concession Assets in Progress
Acquisition of REN PORTGAS, SA
Portion of the CAPEX that is recognized as Cost of concession 
Assets (Revenue from construction Assets minus Own Works)
Electricity
Gas
Cost of Debt (Float)
Intangible assets
CAPEX
Total Number Of Own Shares 
Dividend Per Share
Dividend Per Share Growth
Income tax expense
Energy sector extraordinary contribution (ESEC)
Total Number Of Shares
REN PORTGAS, SA
Financial costs




Appendix 7: EBITDA Breakdown by Segment 
 
 
Electricity EBITDA Breakdown (€M) 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F CAGR 17F-23F
1) Revenues 539.7 476.3 444.1 442.6 439.8 437.9 436.6 435.9 -1.5%
Revenues from assets 317.3 314.2 297.0 295.6 292.7 290.6 289.1 288.0 -1.4%
Return on RAB 140.2 139.5 119.4 118.2 117.0 115.9 114.8 113.8 -3.3%
Hydro land remuneration and lease revenues 
from hydro porctection zone
1 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.7 -4.5%
Remuneration of fully amortized assets 20.8 21.6 24.3 27.2 29.3 31.9 34.8 37.9 9.8%
Recovery of amortizations (net from subsidies) 143.1 140.7 141.4 138.7 135.3 132.1 129.1 126.3 -1.8%
Subsidies amortization 12.2 11.4 11.0 10.6 10.3 9.9 9.5 9.2 -3.6%
Revenues of OPEX 62.3 62.1 62.1 62.0 62.1 62.2 62.5 62.9 0.2%
Construction revenues (IFRIC 12) 157.5 100.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 85.0 -2.7%
2) OPEX 51.9 50.5 48.4 48.1 47.6 47.2 46.9 46.8 -1.3%
Personnel costs 20.5 19.9 18.9 18.8 18.6 18.4 18.3 18.2 -1.5%
External supplies and services 23.2 22.7 21.6 21.4 21.2 21.0 20.8 20.7 -1.5%
Other operational costs 8.2 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 7.9 0.0%
3) Construction costs (IFRIC 12) 143.6 88.2 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 75.0 -2.7%
4) Depreciations and amortizations 154.7 152.1 152.4 149.4 145.6 142.0 138.7 135.5 -1.9%
5) EBIT (1-2-3-4) 189.6 185.4 168.2 170.2 171.6 173.6 176.0 178.5 -0.6%
6) Depreciations and amortizations 154.7 152.1 152.4 149.4 145.6 142.0 138.7 135.5 -1.9%
7) EBITDA (5+6) 344.3 337.6 320.7 319.5 317.2 315.6 314.7 314.1 -1.2%
NG EBITDA Breakdown (€M) 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F CAGR 17-23F
1) Revenues 186.5 174.3 167.2 158.5 149.2 161.6 162.8 157.6 -1.7%
Revenues from assets 134.4 121.6 113.1 110.4 107.7 104.4 102.0 100.7 -3.1%
Return on RAB 74.8 64.5 58.1 57.4 56.3 55.0 54.6 54.4 -2.8%
Tariff smoothing effect (NG) (0.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Recovery of amortizations (net from subsidies) 54.7 52.1 50.2 48.4 46.9 45.2 43.3 42.2 -3.4%
Subsidies amortization 5.9 5.0 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.3 4.1 4.0 -3.6%
Revenues of OPEX 36.3 35.6 35.1 34.5 34.1 33.6 33.3 33.0 -1.3%
Construction revenues (IFRIC 12) 13.8 17.0 19.0 13.5 7.5 23.5 27.5 24.0 5.9%
2) OPEX 24.6 23.8 22.8 22.7 22.5 22.3 22.1 22.1 -1.3%
Personnel costs 7.9 7.5 7.2 7.1 7.0 7.0 6.9 6.9 -1.5%
External supplies and services 12.7 12.4 11.8 11.7 11.6 11.5 11.4 11.3 -1.5%
Other operational costs 4 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 0.0%
3) Construction costs (IFRIC 12) 11.7 15.0 16.8 11.9 6.6 20.7 24.3 21.2 5.9%
4) Depreciations and amortizations 59.8 57.1 54.9 53.1 51.4 49.5 47.4 46.2 -3.5%
5) EBIT (1-2-3-4) 90.4 78.4 72.6 70.8 68.8 69.1 68.9 68.2 -2.3%
6) Depreciations and amortizations 59.8 57.1 54.9 53.1 51.4 49.5 47.4 46.2 -3.5%
7) EBITDA (5+6) 150.2 135.5 127.6 123.9 120.2 118.5 116.4 114.4 -2.8%
Others EBITDA Breakdown (€M) 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F CAGR 17-23F
1) Revenues 12.7 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 0.0%
Other Revenues 12.7 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 20.87 0.0%
Construction revenues (IFRIC 12) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 -
2) OPEX 31.1 31.60 30.19 29.97 29.67 29.39 29.19 29.09 -1.4%
Personnel costs 22.2 21.15 20.12 19.95 19.74 19.53 19.39 19.31 -1.5%
External supplies and services 8 7.82 7.44 7.38 7.30 7.23 7.17 7.14 -1.5%
Other operational costs 0.9 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 2.63 0.0%
3) Construction costs (IFRIC 12) 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
4) Depreciations and amortizations 0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
5) Other 0.3 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -
6) EBIT (18.9) (10.7) (9.3) (9.1) (8.8) (8.5) (8.3) (8.2) -4.3%
7) Depreciations and amortizations 0.2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -





Appendix 8: RAB Breakdown 
´ 
 
Appendix 9: RoR Breakdown 
 
To estimate RoR for each segment we used our forecasts for the 10Y Portuguese yield, applying the average yield for each year to all three regulated 
segments. For NG Transmission and Distribution, the calendar year period matches the regulator’s period for computing the RoR based on the average 10Y 
yield. For electricity, although the regulator uses a different period (October-1 to September), for simplicity we are also computing the RoR using the average 
forecasted 10Y yield for the whole year. The RoR for each segment has a linear relation with the 10Y Yields for each 1% increase in Yields, RoR will increase 
0.4%, as given by: 
 
 RoRElectricity t = RoRbeginning of regulatory period + 0.4 × Δ Average 10Y PT Yieldsfrom Octobert−1 and September t (excluding the
1
12
highest and lowest observations)
 
RoRNG t = RoRbeginning of regulatory period + 0.4 × Δ Average 10Y PT Yieldsfrom Januaryt and December t (excluding the
1




REN PORTGAS EBITDA Breakdown 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F CAGR 17-23F
1) Revenues 83.8 81.4 82.1 82.8 83.6 84.3 85.1 0.2%
Revenues from assets 47.7 45.3 46.1 46.9 47.6 48.4 49.1 0.5%
Return on RAB 28.5 26.9 27.6 28.2 28.9 29.6 30.3 1.0%
Recovery of amortizations (net from subsidies) 19.1 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.9 -0.2%
Subsidies amortization 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -
Revenues of OPEX 12.5 12.4 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 12.3 -0.3%
Construction revenues (IFRIC 12) 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 21.0 0.0%
Other Operating Income 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 0.0%
2) OPEX 20.2 19.5 19.7 20.0 20.2 20.4 20.6 0.3%
Personnel costs 5.5 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 0.3%
External supplies and services 11.5 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.5 11.6 11.8 0.3%
Other operational costs 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 0.0%
3) Construction costs (IFRIC 12) 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 19.6 0.0%
4) Depreciations and amortizations 19.1 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.9 -0.2%
5) EBIT (1-2-3-4) 24.9 23.8 24.3 24.7 25.1 25.6 26.0 0.8%
6) Depreciations and amortizations 19.1 18.4 18.5 18.6 18.7 18.8 18.9 -0.2%
7) EBITDA (5+6) 44.0 42.3 42.8 43.3 43.8 44.4 44.9 0.3%
€M 2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Average RAB 3537.1 3936.4 3837.2 3727.1 3616.7 3506.8 3418.7 3339.2
Electricity 2152.7 2155.7 2103.2 2035.8 1971.4 1910.8 1853.8 1800.1
Premium 1102.6 1181.1 1197.4 1195.6 1192.9 1189.8 1186.3 1182.6
No Premium 1050.1 974.6 905.8 840.2 778.5 721.0 667.5 617.5
Natural Gas 1116.1 1072.8 1034.9 1000.7 962.7 921.1 897.3 878.5
Land 268.3 256.3 244.9 234.0 223.6 213.6 204.1 195.0
REN PORTGAS 0 451.6 454.2 456.6 459.0 461.3 463.5 465.6
Electricity RoR 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Tariff 6.1% 5.5% 5.3% 5.4% 5.5% 5.6% 5.7%
Real 6.1% 5.3% 5.4% 5.5% 5.6% 5.7% 5.8%
RoR CAP 9.15% 9.75% 9.75% 9.75% 9.75% 9.75% 9.75%
RoR Floor 5.65% 4.75% 4.75% 4.75% 4.75% 4.75% 4.75%
Yield 3.43% 2.08% 2.37% 2.66% 2.94% 3.23% 3.52%
Changes in Yields -0.17% -0.62% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29%
Relationsip between 
1%change in yield and 
changes in ROR
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
Premium 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75% 0.75%
RoR Base 5.50% Yield 2.70%
RoRFloor 4.75% Yield 0.82%
RoR Cap 9.75% Yield 13.32%
0.4
Relationsip between 1%change in yield 
and changes in ROR
Electricity Regulatory Period (2018-2020)
NG Transportation RoR 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Tariff 6.7% 6.0% 5.6% 5.7% 5.8% 6.0% 6.1%
Real 6.0% 5.6% 5.7% 5.8% 6.0% 6.1% 6.2%
RoR CAP 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00% 9.00%
RoR Floor 5.40% 5.40% 5.40% 5.40% 5.40% 5.40% 5.40%
Yield 3.07% 2.08% 2.37% 2.66% 2.94% 3.23% 3.52%
Changes in Yields 0.29% -0.99% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29%
Relationsip between 
1%change in yield and 
changes in ROR
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
RoR Base 5.90% Yield 2.78%
RoRFloor 5.40% Yield 1.53%
RoR Cap 9.00% Yield 10.53%
0.4
NG Transportation Regulatory Period (2016-
2019)
Relationsip between 1%change in yield 






Appendix 10: REN’s CAPEX 
 
CAPEX assumptions follow PDIRT-E 2018-27 (Electricity), PDIRGN 2018-27 (NG), PDIRD 2017-21 (REN Portgás). The first two are dependent on a 
government decision, however the last one has already received approval. Even though the programs might not be ultimately approved by the state, in our 
opinion, this is still the best estimation for capital expenditures. 
Transfers to RAB vs CAPEX – In our assumption, all future CAPEX will be added to RAB (assuming no subsidies). Although,  Transfers to RAB does 
not match CAPEX every year. Based on REN’s historical financial statements, 2.38% of CAPEXt is going directly to RABt/Concession Assetst, and the 
remaining 97.62% goes to Concession Assets in Progress,, being then added to RAB/Concession Assets in t+1 (assuming that those assets will be ready to 
work in one year time). Accordingly, transfers to RAB in year t are given by: 
Transfers to RABt = 2.38% CAPEXt + Concession Assets in Progesst−1 
Additionally, we are assuming that the whole amount of CAPEX in the electricity sector will be remunerated with RoR premium, following management 








NG Distribution RoR 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Tariff 6.2% 6.3% 5.9% 6.0% 6.2% 6.3% 6.4%
Real 6.3% 5.9% 6.0% 6.2% 6.3% 6.4% 6.5%
RoR CAP 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 9.30% 9.30%
RoR Floor 5.70% 5.70% 5.70% 5.70% 5.70% 5.70% 5.70%
Yield 3.07% 2.08% 2.37% 2.66% 2.94% 3.23% 3.52%
Changes in Yields 0.29% -0.99% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29% 0.29%
Relationsip between 
1%change in yield and 
changes in ROR
0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
RoR Base 6.20% Yield 2.78%
RoRFloor 5.70% Yield 1.53%
RoR Cap 9.30% Yield 10.53%
0.4
NG Distribution Regulatory Period 
(2016-2019)
Relationsip between 1%change 
in yield and changes in ROR
138,214.0 125,214.0 119,714.0 113,714.0 129,714.0 133,714.0 130,214.0
214.0 214.0 214.0 214.0 214.0 214.0 214.0
138,000.0 125,000.0 119,500.0 113,500.0 129,500.0 133,500.0 130,000.0
100,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0
17,000.0 19,000.0 13,500.0 7,500.0 23,500.0 27,500.0 24,000.0
17,000.0 19,000.0 13,500.0 7,000.0 6,500.0 5,500.0 5,500.0
0.0 0.0 0.0 500.0 17,000.0 22,000.0 18,500.0
21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
157,728.1 99,643.1 85,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0 85,000.0
13,778.9 17,047.6 18,869.1 13,357.2 7,880.7 23,595.2 27,416.7
499.7 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0 21,000.0
2023F
Property, plant and equipment




Third Interconnection with Spain (1st stage)
Ren Portgas












After-tax Re EDP Gás
Pre-tax Re
Pre-tax Re EDP Gás




Pre-tax WACC EDP Gás
Proposed WACC
Proposed WACC EDP Gás
REN's NG and Electricty WACC computed by the regulator
Variable Regulatory Period NG 2016-2017 to 2018-2019 Regulatory Period Electricity 2018-2020
Risk Free Rate
1.73% 1%
5 years Geometric average of 10-year bonds yields of EU countries rated AAA: 
Germany, Finland, Austria, Netherlands
5 years Geometric average of 10-year bonds yields of EU countries rated 
AAA: Germany, Finland, Austria, Netherlands
Market Risk Premium (Rm + CRP)
[5,88% : 6,28%] [6,92% : 8,4%]
[3,75% : 4,6%] (average spread between S&P 500 returns and 10-year T-bills and 
the median between european regulators) + 1,68% (spread between 5-year 
geometric mean 10-year bonds 
[3,52% : 5%] (average spread between S&P 500 returns and 10-year T-bills 
and the median between european regulators) + 3,4% (spread between 5-

































Appendix 12: Electricity and Natural Gas Value Chains 
 
Electricity Value Chain 
 
 
Natural Gas Value Chain 
 
 
Appendix 13: Order of Merit of Energy Sources 
The order of merit refers to the priority of the different sources of energy to enter the electricity market. The quantities produced are decided at each day 
in the spot market (OMIE) through an action between the Portuguese and the Spanish producers and distributors. Once demand matches supply, the price 
is decided. In an unlikely scenario of renewable energies producing enough to accommodate all the demand none of the producers using the other sources 
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Appendix 16: BoD Remuneration
 




Rodrigo Costa 58 No Chairman of the BoD and CEO 561,458.28 € 2014 2017
Gonçalo Morais Soares 46 No Executive Director and CFO 572,156.57 € 2012 2017
João Faria Conceição 43 No
Executive Director and COO 572,156.57 € 2009 2017
Guangchao (appointed by the StateGrid 
International Development Limited) 49 No
Vice-Chairman 80,000.04 € 2012 2017
Mengrong Cheng 48 No Director 36,000.00 € 2012 2017
Longhua Jiang 50 No Director 36,000.00 € 2014 2017
Omar Al-Wahaibi 51 No Director 36,000.00 € 2015 2017
Jorge Manuel Magalhães Correia 59 No Director 36,000.00 € 2015 2017
Manuel Ramos de Sousa Sebastião 67 Yes
Director and Chairman of Audit 
Comittee
75,000.00 € 2015 2017
Gonçalo Gil Mata 46 Yes
Director and Chairman of Audit 
Comittee
60,000.00 € 2015 2017
Maria Estela Barbot 58 Yes
Director and Chairman of Audit 
Comittee
60,000.00 € 2015 2017





Appendix 17: Comparable Companies 
Any valuation with multiples must begin with the definition of a peer group with which to benchmark the relative measures chosen. Often, industry 
classifications are relied on to classify comparable companies and construct a peer group. However, this intersectional approach effectuated by the 
classification/screening method presents difficulties in certain markets, particularly those outside the United States, where the number of public companies 
tends to be less abundant. Accordingly, we decided to employ the Sum of Absolute Rank Differences (SARD) approach developed by Knudsen et al. (2017) 
as a basis for our peer group search.1 The SARD approach is an intuitive method that involves minimizing the sum of rank distances between fundamental 
factors of the subject company and prospective peers. That is, a much broader group of companies is first analyzed, and important fundamental economic 
and share price drivers, such as Return on Equity, Dividend Yield, Operating Margin, Capital Structure, etc. are then ranked across the entire group. The 
sum of the absolute rank differences between all prospective peer companies and the subject company is then compared, with a smaller sum designating 
a relatively more comparable peer than a larger sum. Formally, this framework is expressed by the following formula, representing the SARD between 
company i (generally fixed as the subject company) and company j: 




where r subscript k,i represents the rank of the kth factor for company i. The EURO STOXX 800, the FTSE 100, and the S&P Latin America 40 index were 
chosen as the dataset for the SARD analysis (note no Latin American companies would end up making the peer group) as a means of starting from a very 
broad perspective. Once the SARD was calculated for each company based on a number of fundamental financial drivers, a subjective decision was made 
to exclude companies based on unrelated industry classifications. The final peer group, constituting those companies which minimized the SARD and also 









































































































0 RENE PL 6.1 48 91.0 28 52.0 64 21.6 159 2.4 617 10.1 569 0.3 771 2.6 629 68.6 136 218.9 126 3.9 851
2 849 SRG IM  5.2 94 92.0 27 57.8 55 50.1 58 5.0 418 16.8 324 0.5 753 3.8 557 64.5 168 181.9 158 5.6 757
5 995 ELI BB  3.6 274 41.9 117 27.3 179 27.0 118 3.5 544 9.0 607 0.9 615 2.0 659 57.1 241 132.9 231 4.1 834
6 999 TRN IM  4.2 188 75.7 42 50.8 66 29.6 109 3.9 521 18.6 260 0.7 702 5.9 455 73.3 102 274.4 92 5.4 774
12 1127 ENG SQ  5.1 97 74.5 43 50.3 70 34.5 83 5.3 393 17.9 289 1.1 513 5.3 485 65.2 157 187.8 147 4.6 818
24 1526 NG/LN 4.4 175 34.3 157 24.4 210 19.6 190 4.5 454 20.3 227 0.8 644 3.8 555 67.6 141 208.9 131 8.0 474
27 1605 REE SQ  4.2 195 75.8 41 50.7 68 31.1 104 5.7 365 23.0 178 0.8 652 5.1 494 69.0 135 222.4 125 9.0 364  
 
 
Appendix 18: Valuation through Multiples 
 
The multiples were calculated for 2018F. Multiples for REN were based on team estimates (pro forma financial statements), and peer multiples were taken 
from Bloomberg consensus estimates. Median values were calculated as reference points to mitigate the effects of outlier values. Extensive charts of the 
forecasted multiples for REN against the peer group are given below.  
To actually capitalize REN's projected results with these median values, an important decision needed to be made regarding which multiples to finally 
employ in the valuation and which, if any, to exclude as not representative of REN’s market valuation. Not all multiples are equally relevant across industries 
and business models, and certain nuances work to make certain multiples generally more acceptable under certain conditions. For example, as a measure 
of total firm value to a proxy of total firm earnings, the EV/EBITDA multiple is seen as a preferable multiple among companies with significant differences 
in capital structure. As shown previously, the debt-to-equity ratio of the companies ranges from 1.08 to 2.65, and thus we were quickly motivated to favor 
the EV/EBITDA multiple. However, accepting a certain multiple as relevant/applicable could still lead to a naive application of capitalizing the multiple if 
we do not understand the subject company's historical behavior and also the historical relation to the peer group.  
An additional series of charts below was employed to help resolve this problem. For example, refer to the chart of REN's historical EV/EBITDA multiple 
along with the historical median of the peer group. We see that for a time, REN traded along with the valuation of the peer group, although a divergence 
has emerged over the course of the past few years. We see similar behavior in the P/E and P/D ratios. Compare this to the subsequent P/Sales multiple, 
where we see that REN has always traded at a discount to the peer group. Thus, applying the peer median in the P/Sales multiple to REN's forecasted 
revenues is effectively asking the market to do something it has never done before in valuing REN at the same P/Sales multiple as the peer group. We must 
accept this as a lower likelihood scenario than the previous case and adjust the significance of this multiple lower and/or simply exclude it accordingly. 
The most acute example of this decision process is seen with the P/B multiple, which shows that REN has always traded at a large discount to the market 
based on this multiple compared to the peer group, and thus an interpretation can be made that the market simply does not value REN based on book value 
in the same way that it does the peer group.  
Taking these factors into consideration, we decided to exclude the P/Sales and P/Book ratios from our multiples-based valuation. However, we also 
discounted the remaining multiples by the average spread over the observation period 2007-2016, to account for the somewhat persistent, but less acute, 






   
 
 
                                                 























































Appendix 19: Cost of Debt 
 
Portuguese 10Y Bond Yield: To forecast the 10Y yield we compute the implicit forward rate between the 5Y yield and the 15Y yield, getting the r(5;15)- 
the 10Y yield five years from now. In that sense, the 10Y yield for 2022YE is estimated to be 3.38%. Then, a linear interpolation/extrapolation gives the 
yields for each one of the years in our forecast period. As a result, we are assuming a linear increase YoY in the 10Y yields. Moving from 2023F to the 
Terminal Value, we are assuming the same increase as for the 10Y German yield. 
German 10Y Bond Yield: Data extracted from Bloomberg. For the Terminal Value we are assuming an increase to 2.45%, considering a reasonable 
premium over the ECB´s inflation rate target of 2%.  
Average Yields: For RoR, CRP and Cost of Debt computations we are considering the average between the yield at the beginning and the end of the year.  
Risk Free Rate: Average of German 10Y yield at the beginning and the end of the year. 
Country Risk Premium: Difference between the historical average of Portuguese and German 10Y yields. 
Cost of Debt (Float): Equal to the yearly average of the 10Y Portuguese yield minus a spread of 28.2bps, which corresponds to the spread between the 
most recent bond issue from both REN and the Portuguese State in January 2018. For the Terminal Value we dropped the spread to 0%, as we do not 
consider it reasonable that the company will keep financing at a lower rate than the government in the long run. 
Cost of Debt (Fixed):  We are assuming that the company will try to maintain the fixed rate bond weight relatively stable in relation to the total debt. This 
will function as a hedge strategy against the expected increase in yields. Accordingly, we are assuming the partial rollover of the maturing bonds in January 
2018, already including the bond issued to pay the bridge loan used to acquire EDP Gás Distribuição. To assess the fixed cost of debt we take the average 
of the outstanding fixed rate bonds, weighted by the respective amount outstanding. For the Terminal Value, we are assuming a stabilization at 55% fixed 
rate debt, because in periods of “normal” interest rates, major amounts of fixed rate debt may result in large losses if interest rates fall.  
Cost of Debt: 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 20: WACC Assumptions 
 
Cost of Equity: Capital Asset Pricing Model with Country Risk Premium 
𝑅𝑒 = 𝑅𝐹𝑅 + 𝐶𝑅𝑃 + 𝛽 ∗ 𝐸𝑅𝑃 
Unlevered Beta: We have used a Pure-Play method to get REN’s Levered Beta. First Step: collect the levered betas of the peers (Bloomberg), and 
deleverage them in accordance with the respective capital structures and effective tax rates. Second step: take the average of these unlevered betas to 
estimate REN’s unlevered beta. Finally, lever this estimate at REN’s capital structure and effective tax rate.  We confirmed our result by regressing REN 
against various indices, which confirmed our computation using the Pure-Play method. 
 
ERP: Computed using the Constant Sharpe Ratio with forecasted volatility approach (Moschella, J. CFA, 2017)2. We first calculate the excess return from 
the last 10 years of monthly returns of the PSI20 over the 10Y German bond yield. The second step is to divide the annualized average of the excess returns 
by the historical standard deviation of the PSI20. With that we arrive at the Index Constant Sharpe Ratio. The third and final step is to multiply this Sharpe 





∗ 𝜎𝑃𝑆𝐼20 𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡 
 
WACC: We have used market values for the capital structure. Starting from the company’s assumed target capital structure, in accounting terms, of 70% 
Debt and 30% Equity, we computed the market capital structure by applying the P/Book historical average. From this we obtain a market Capital Structure 
of 60% Debt and 40% Equity. From there we work backwards, computing the Enterprise Value and subtracting the accounting Net Debt to get the capital 





















                                                 
2 1 Moschella, J. CFA, 2017. Financial Modeling for Equity Research: A Step-by-Step Guide to Earnings Modeling. Gutenberg Research LLC. 
2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F Terminal Value
10Y Portuguese Bond Yield 1.93% 2.22% 2.51% 2.80% 3.09% 3.38% 3.67% 4.67%
10Y PT Yield YoY change 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029 0.0029
Average Yield 2.08% 2.37% 2.66% 2.94% 3.23% 3.52%
10Y Germany Bond Yield 0.42% 0.89% 1.28% 1.45% 1.45% 1.45% 1.45% 2.45%
Risk Free Rate 0.32% 0.66% 1.09% 1.37% 1.45% 1.45% 1.45% 2.45%
Country Risk Premium 2.53% 1.42% 1.28% 1.29% 1.49% 1.78% 2.07% 2.22%
Cost of Debt (Float) 2.56% 1.79% 2.08% 2.37% 2.66% 2.95% 3.24% 4.67%
Spread with 10Y PT yield -0.282% -0.282% -0.282% -0.282% -0.282% -0.282% -0.282% 0%
Cost of Debt (Fix) 2.80% 2.49% 2.49% 2.08% 2.08% 2.08% 2.58% 2.73%
Fix Rate (% of Total) 56% 63% 65% 56% 57% 58% 53% 55%
Variable Rate (% of Total) 44% 37% 35% 44% 43% 42% 47% 45%
Cost of Debt 2.70% 2.23% 2.35% 2.21% 2.33% 2.45% 2.887% 3.60%
After-tax Cost of Debt 1.91% 1.55% 1.63% 1.53% 1.61% 1.69% 2.00% 2.49%
2016 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Fix Rate Bonds 62.8% 55.8% 62.6% 64.6% 55.7% 56.8% 58.0% 53.2%
Float Rate Bonds 4.8% 4.2% 4.4% 4.5% 4.6% 4.7% 4.8% 4.9%
Commercial Paper 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0% 15.0%
Bank Borrowings 18.3% 15.5% 18.5% 16.3% 25.0% 23.7% 22.5% 27.1%
REN Portgas 0.0% 10.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Financial Lease 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Prepaid Interest -1.1% -0.7% -0.6% -0.4% -0.4% -0.3% -0.2% -0.2%
Accrued Interest 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Fix Rate Bonds Issue Date Maturity Date Maturity Initial Amount Outstanding Amount Interest Rate
1/31/2013 1/31/2018 0.085 300,000 162,800 4.13%
10/17/2013 10/16/2020 2.795 400,000 267,755 4.75%
2/12/2015 2/12/2025 7.123 300,000 500,000 2.50%
6/1/2016 6/1/2023 5.419 550,000 550,000 1.75%
6/20/2009 6/20/2024 5.474 99,555 99,555 2.71%
10/17/2013 10/16/2020 1.795 400,000 267,755 4.75%
2/12/2015 2/12/2025 6.123 300,000 500,000 2.50%
6/1/2016 6/1/2023 4.419 550,000 550,000 1.75%










Appendix 21: REN’s Share Capital Increase 
 





Effective Tax Rate Debt to Equity Beta Levered Beta Unlevered
SNAM SPA 34.26% 1.707 0.652 0.307
ELIA SYSTEM OPERATOR SA/NV 15.08% 1.088 0.540 0.281
TERNA SPA 32.72% 2.659 0.645 0.231
ENAGAS SA 22.32% 2.054 0.687 0.265
NATIONAL GRID PLC 17.12% 1.405 0.866 0.400
RED ELECTRICA CORPORACION SA 24.94% 2.089 0.739 0.288
REDES ENERGETICAS NACIONAIS 30.47% 2.170 0.741 0.295
Beta  Unlevered (Based on peers)
5Y Monthly Data R Squared Beta #Obs
PSI 20 0.460 0.625 60
STOXX 600 0.147 0.513 60
Euronext 150 0.269 0.615 60
STOXX Utilities 0.247 0.591 60
S&P 500 0.033 0.301 60
Beta Levered (regression against market index)
History Period: 10Y Average Excess Return Standard Deviation Constant Sharpe Ratio ERP
PSI 20 10.37% 19.91% 0.52 8.53%
STOXX 600 12.01% 15.07% 0.80 8.80%
EURONEXT 150 23.16% 18.70% 1.24 13.67%
STOXX UTILITIES 5.02% 15.19% 0.33 3.65%
S&P 500 16.90% 15.22% 1.11 12.26%
DCF Analysis 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F Terminal
COST OF EQUITY
Risk Free Rate (RFR) 0,7% 1,1% 1,4% 1,5% 1,5% 1,5% 2,5%
Country Risk Premium (CRP) 1,4% 1,3% 1,3% 1,5% 1,8% 2,1% 2,2%
Beta Unlevered 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3
Debt-to-Equity 1,5 1,4 1,4 1,4 1,2 1,1 1,5
Effective Tax Rate 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8%
Beta (β) 0,60 0,59 0,57 0,55 0,54 0,53 0,60
Equity Risk Premium (ERP) 8,5% 8,5% 8,5% 8,5% 8,5% 8,5% 8,5%
Cost of equity 7,2% 7,4% 7,5% 7,7% 7,8% 8,0% 9,8%
COST OF DEBT
Cost of debt 2,2% 2,3% 2,2% 2,3% 2,4% 2,9% 3,6%
Marginal tax rate 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8% 30,8%
After-tax cost of debt 1,5% 1,6% 1,5% 1,6% 1,7% 2,0% 2,5%
WACC
Weight of equity 40,3% 40,8% 42,7% 44,4% 45,6% 46,8% 40,0%
Weight of debt 59,7% 59,2% 57,3% 55,6% 54,4% 53,2% 60,0%
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Appendix 22: Sum of the Parts (SoP) Analysis 
 
DCF for Core Segments 
We have computed the FCFF for all four of REN’s segments and discount these at the same WACC, as we consider that since all the segments are exposed 
100% to Portugal it is thus reasonable to assume the same determinants of the WACC. The three main segments (excluding the others) are utilities, and 
they are also regulated by ERSE, hence they have similar behaviour to market changes, justifying the same Beta and consequently the same cost of equity.  
Growth Rates: Electricity and Natural Gas Transmission are at a mature stage, and RAB is in a decreasing trend, so revenues are expected to decrease at a 
relatively constant pace. To compute the growth rate of those segment’s FCFF, we decided to assume the ECB’s inflation rate long term target minus the 
revenue CAGR in 2017F-23F. 
g = πECB long term target − REN
′s RevenuesCAGR 17F−23F 
 
However, this approach didn’t seem reasonable for REN Portgas, because for that period the segment is still growing revenues because RAB still increasing, 
although this is not expected to be maintained in perpetuity since RAB is expected to start decreasing from 2023 onwards. We are assuming that in 
perpetuity REN’s revenues in this sector will move at 0.5% CAGR. 
The others segment functions as somewhat of a support for the core businesses, so we compute the growth rate of the FCFF as the weighted average of the 
growth rates of the core segments. FCFF is thus given by: 
 








ELECTRICITY (€'000) 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
EBIT 185,442.6 168,232.1 170,169.0 171,606.1 173,615.7 175,982.9 178,539.8 174,798.3
Tax Rate 29.1% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8%
ESEC (17,873.1) (15,789.8) (15,413.9) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unlevered Net Income 113,566.1 100,636.1 102,344.4 118,746.5 120,140.4 121,784.9 123,614.9 121,031.9
D&A 152,118.5 152,118.5 152,118.5 152,118.5 152,118.5 152,118.5 152,118.5 152,118.5
Revenue from Construction of Concession Assets (100,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (87,142.9)
Changes in Non Current Operational Assets 3,357.9 3,366.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Changes in Non Current Operational Liabilities (4,765.7) (4,344.1) (2,647.8) (2,546.5) (2,415.8) (2,280.8) (2,162.0) (2,162.0)
Changes in NWC 37,650.5 37,650.5 37,650.5 37,650.5 37,650.5 37,650.5 37,650.5 37,650.5
Cash Flow From Investiment Activities (100,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (85,000.0) (135,543.4)
FCFF 190165.557 190293.98 152451.706 165102.0774 169119.89 164165.1 160794.8 114244.6
PV of FCFF 908466.9 746820.5 618652.8 473024.0 317562.6 160794.8
PV of Terminal Value 1887866.2 1963172.3 2043381.5 2131114.2 2226893.5 2334282.2
2,796,333ENTERPRISE VALUE g = 0.5%
NATURAL GAS (€'000) 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
EBIT 78,380.6 72,623.2 70,813.6 68,804.8 69,063.6 68,948.7 68,151.9 70,969.5
Tax Rate 29.1% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8%
ESEC (7,924.9) (9,748.6) (9,500.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unlevered Net Income 47,630.2 40,511.5 39,508.1 47,605.0 47,781.2 47,698.6 47,162.1 49,111.8
D&A 57,089.7 54,941.5 53,062.0 51,366.0 49,480.8 47,417.4 46,235.8 46,235.8
Revenue from Construction of Concession Assets (17,000.0) (19,000.0) (13,500.0) (7,500.0) (23,500.0) (27,500.0) (24,000.0) (18,857.1)
Cost with Construction of Concession Assets 15,009.4 16,775.2 11,919.2 6,621.8 20,748.3 24,279.9 21,189.8 16,649.1
Changes in Non Current Operational Assets 1,401.8 1,386.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Changes in Non Current Operational Liabilities (4,765.7) (4,344.1) (2,647.8) (2,546.5) (2,415.8) (2,280.8) (2,162.0) (2,162.0)
Changes in NWC 15,717.5 13,669.2 (651.7) (664.5) 1,710.7 386.8 (433.0) 2,336.3
Cash Flow From Investiment Activities (17,000.0) (19,000.0) (13,500.0) (7,500.0) (23,500.0) (27,500.0) (24,000.0) (46,235.8)
FCFF 98082.93298 84939.965 74189.8741 87381.92034 70305.262 62501.97 63992.67 47078.09
PV of FCFF 404037.1 331825.8 268162.1 188542.0 123550.7 63992.7
PV of Terminal Value 761694.7 792078.4 824440.3 859837.7 898481.6 941809.6
1,165,732ENTERPRISE VALUE g = 0.4%
OTHERS (€'000) 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
EBIT (10,736.5) (9,327.1) (9,100.9) (8,802.9) (8,522.2) (8,328.5) (8,224.6) (9,006.1)
Tax Rate 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Unlevered Net Income (7,609.9) (6,455.0) (6,298.5) (6,090.6) (5,896.0) (5,761.6) (5,691.5) (6,232.3)
Changes in Non Current Operational Assets 135.4 142.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Changes in Non Current Operational Liabilities (460.2) (445.6) (277.5) (272.8) (265.6) (255.8) (245.3) (245.3)
Changes in NWC 1,517.7 1,402.2 (68.3) (71.2) 188.1 43.4 (49.1) 240.8
Cash Flow From Investiment Activities (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) (214.0) 0.0
FCFF (6,631.0) (5,570.2) (6,858.2) (6,648.6) (6,187.5) (6,188.0) (6,199.9) (6,236.8)
PV of FCFF (34,049.4) (29,615.2) (23,686.8) (17,769.7) (12,102.7) (6,199.9)
PV of Terminal Value (105,304.4) (109,504.9) (113,978.9) (118,872.6) (124,215.2) (130,205.3)
-139,354ENTERPRISE VALUE g = 0.6%
REN PORTGAS (€'000) 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
EBIT 24,881.0 23,846.5 24,250.0 24,681.4 25,113.9 25,573.6 26,034.1 24,911.5
Tax Rate 29.1% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8% 30.8%
ESEC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Unlevered Net Income 17,635.3 16,503.4 16,782.8 17,076.7 17,374.9 17,691.8 18,015.9 17,239.1
D&A 19,132.4 18,443.0 18,537.6 18,628.7 18,716.5 18,801.0 18,882.3 18,882.3
Revenue from Construction of Concession Assets (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0)
Cost with Construction of Concession Assets 19,568.5 19,568.5 19,568.5 19,568.5 19,568.5 19,568.5 19,568.5 19,568.5
Changes in Deferred Tax Assets (17,145.0) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Changes in Deferred Tax Liabilities 50,561.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Changes in Non Current Operational Assets (14,092.3) 564.2 (163.0) (171.0) (170.2) (178.1) (177.3) (177.3)
Changes in Non Current Operational Liabilities 23,198.8 -928.7 268.4 281.5 280.2 293.2 291.9 291.9
Changes in NWC 1,518.8 1,320.9 (63.0) (64.2) 165.3 37.4 (41.8) 225.8
Cash Flow From Investiment Activities (552,693.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (21,000.0) (18,882.3)
FCFF (473,315.4) 13471.2232 12931.2627 13320.24996 13935.192 14213.72 14539.49 16147.93
PV of FCFF 74366.24 63324.09 52451.73 40811.59 28084.31 14539.49
PV of Terminal Value 338268.05 351761.41 366133.30 381853.26 399015.00 418256.91
412,634ENTERPRISE VALUE g = 1.5%
 
28 
DDM for Electrogas 
The dividend discount model is the most appropriate method to value Electrogas given the information available about the company and its expected stable 
dividend.  
To compute the cost of equity we used the 10Y Chilean Bond yield, ERP and Beta from Damodaran for emerging markets, adapting the Beta in accordance 
with the known capital structure of Electrogas of almost 0% debt.   
As a complementary method we assess the value of the company through a multiples approach, by multiplying the implicit net income of the company 
implied in the accounting gain recognized by REN in its Income Statement by the P/E ratio for emerging market provided by Damodaran. Both approaches 
yielded similar figures. 





Appendix 23: FCFE & DDM Analysis 
 
This model is also suitable to value REN due to the relatively stable Capital Structure. We took an approach that assumes that the amounts of investment 
in CAPEX and NWC made by the company at each year will be financed in accordance with the market capital structure of that specific year. We sum up the 
FCFF to each one of the segments and applied the following formula. Electrogas was valued through the DDM model. . Recognizing that equity represents 
a leverage position in the business, we have computed the Terminal Growth rate for FCFE by multiplying Assets/Equity ratio by the average expected 
growth rate in the FCFF. 
𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐸𝑡 = 𝐹𝐶𝐹𝐹𝑡 + 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑡𝑎𝑥 𝑛𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑡 +
𝐷
𝐸𝑉𝑇𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒𝑡
𝑥 (𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥𝑡 − 𝐷&𝐴𝑡 + Δ𝑁𝑊𝐶𝑡) 









DDM ELETROGAS 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
Dividends 7,491.9 7,641.7 7,794.6 8,106.4 8,430.6 8,767.8 8,767.8
Eq Eletrogas 155,381.5 159,484.1 163,746.8 168,178.9 172,622.3 177,064.3 -
Mult. ELECTROGAS 2018F
REN's Stake 42.5%
Gain from Electrogas 7,650
Electrogas Net Income 18,000
P/E Mult. 16.76
Electrogas Valuation 301,680











Natural Gas 26.5% 1,165.73






Price Target 18YE/sh 2.76
Upside Potential 18YE 15%
ENTERPRISE VALUE
2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
FCFF 283135.0 232714.6 259155.7 247172.8 234692.8 233127.0 171233.9
Net Interest Expense (57,309.7) (58,391.3) (52,584.1) (54,495.0) (56,182.9) (66,025.2) (88,040.1)
Tax Rate 31% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31% 31%
After Tax Net Interest Expense (39,662.2) (40,411.0) (36,382.2) (37,702.1) (38,867.3) (45,690.3) (60,925.0)
Target D/EV 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.53 0.60
Capital Expenditures 125214.0 119714.0 113714.0 129714.0 133714.0 130214.0 200661.6
Depreciations and Amortizations (225,831.7) (220,952.5) (215,576.6) (210,229.0) (204,908.0) (200,661.6) (200,661.6)
Changes in Net Working Capital (49,576.5) 2,394.2 2,467.4 (6,450.5) (1,476.5) 1,665.2 (8,496.1)
FCFE (without Electrogás) 153,876.2 133,782.6 165,822.4 161,116.9 156,291.9 150,871.4 105,211.3
PV of FCFE 772,335.9 664,336.6 570,432.2 435,563.2 295,953.9 150,871.4
PV of Terminal Value 911,227.5 978,821.8 1,052,393.2 1,132,903.3 1,221,685.7 1,319,739.3
Terminal Growth Rate 1.7%
Terminal Cost of Equity 9.8%
PV of FCFE 772,335.9





Upside Potential 18YE 16%
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Dividend Discount Model 
REN pays a stable dividend, and pays very high attention to its maintenance when deciding to invest. In our forecast the dividend will remain sustainable, 
as the payout ratio remains slightly above or even below 80%. We are assuming an increase YoY from 2020 onwards, when ESEC ceases, and a long-term 




Appendix 24: Liquidation Approach 
 
In the case that the concession is not renewed the State will have to reimburse the book value of REN assets, at the time of expiry of concession contracts.  
We are assuming the RAB will be amortized at the historical rate and that CAPEX for both Electricity and NG transmission will decrease at 1% over the 
course of the concessions. In REN Portgás case in 2024 we are assuming a 20% decrease to comply with the company’s expectations of a decrease in RAB. 
For the remaining years of the concession we are assuming a decrease of 2.50% in CAPEX, complying with the expected mature stage of the market. 
 We are considering the same FCFF as for the Sum of the Parts approach, although we are discounting the Terminal FCFF only until the end of each 


















2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
Dividends Paid 113,426.0 113,426.0 116,261.6 119,168.2 122,147.4 125,201.1 125,201.1
PV of Dividends 593,089.5 515,244.6 432,020.6 339,915.2 238,046.3 125,201.1




Terminal Cost of Equity 9.8%





Upside Potential 18YE 5%
Number of Shares Outstanding




€M … 2022F 2023F … 2046F 2047F 2048F … 2055F 2056F 2057F
Average RAB 3418.66 3339.17 2168.40 1806.71 1784.40 1293.47 1278.68 1264.14
Electricity 1853.79 1800.10 1391.24 1376.49 1361.95 1265.23 1252.09 1239.12
Premium 1186.34 1182.58 1237.26 1231.54 1225.49 1175.81 1167.91 1159.87
No Premium 667.45 617.52 153.98 144.95 136.46 89.42 84.18 79.24
Natural Gas 897.27 878.45 339.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Land 204.12 195.03 48.63 45.78 43.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
REN Portgas 463.47 465.59 389.46 384.43 379.36 0.00 0.00 0.00
Segment Depreciation CAPEX CAPEX 2023F CAPEX Decrease
Electricity 5.9% 85,000 51,475.8 1%
Natural Gas 5.0% 5,500 39,422.6 1%
REN Portgas 3.7% 21,000 36,579.2 20%
Land 5.9% 0 1,039.7 0%
Electricity (including Land) 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
FCFF 190,294 152,451.7 165,102.1 169,119.9 164,165.1 160,794.8 114,244.6
PV of FCFF (until 2057) 2,416,896.4 2,315,420.5 2,251,341 2,175,811.8 2,096,879.3 2,025,916.4
Liquidation Value 169,987.4 176,768.1 183,990.3 191,889.98 200,514.1 210,183.6
Natural Gas 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
FCFF 84,940.0 74,189.9 87,381.9 70,305.3 62,502.0 63,992.7 47,078.1
PV of FCFF (until 2046) 915,628.1 863,823.8 821,896.0 766,050.5 727,014.3 696,557.5
Liquidation Value 81,472.1 84,721.9 88,183.4 91,969.6 96,103.0 100,737.4
REN PORTGAS 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F TV
FCFF 13,471.2 12,931.3 13,320.2 13,935.2 14,213.7 14,539.5 16,147.9
PV of FCFF (until 2048) 278,362.6 275,457.8 273,252.5 271,092.5 268,714.8 266,774.0
Liquidation Value 333,481.0 346,783.4 360,951.9 376,449.4 393,368.2 412,337.8
g electricity 0.5%
g Natural Gas 0.4%
g REN Portgas 1.5%
Long-Term WACC 5.4%
PV of FCFF (Concession 
Segments)
3,610,887
PV of Liquidation Amount 584,940.4
Others (139,353.7)






Upside Potential 18YE 3%
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Appendix 25: Electricity and NG Allowed Revenues  
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Tariffs 
Deviations 








RAB RoR x 
Contrary to what happens in 
Electricity Transmission, in 
the NG there are no incentives 
to be efficient at a CAPEX level. 
The remuneration 
mechanism, however, is the 
same. 
Resulting from differences 
between the estimated and 
the actual demand and 
recovered 2y after, and 
remunerated at a rate 
corresponding to the daily 
average of the 12-month 
Euribor observed during 
those years, plus a spread that 
is annually published by 
ERSE. 
 
Mechanism developed by the 
regulator at the time of 
construction of Sines Terminal 
which implied huge amounts 
of CAPEX. To prevent final 
consumers from enduring a 
huge increase in the tariffs, the 
regulator set this mechanism 
which smoothed out the costs. 
Depreciation of the RAB, 
net of subsidies. 












RAB RoR x 
REN receives an increase 
based on efficiency. If it can 
build at lower costs than 
the ones referenced by 
ERSE, it will receive a RoR 
with premium and will also 
recognize a higher RAB 
than the real. Higher RAB 
and higher RoR will be the 
incentive to be efficient at a 
CAPEX level. 
 
Incentive to Rational 
Economic Investments: 
Incentive to the operator be 
rational on its investments, 
for instance to remunerate 
fully amortized assets that 
are still in good operations 
conditions. 
Resulting from differences 
between the estimated and 
the actual demand and 
recovered 2y after and 
remunerated at a rate 
corresponding to the daily 
average of the 12-month 
Euribor observed during 
those years, plus a spread 
that is annually published 
by ERSE. 
 
Protection zone land 
fixed annual rent. 
 
OPEX is defined at the 
beginning of each regulatory 
period of three years. The 
formula states how allowed 
OPEX will increase from one 
year to the next, on a price-
cap base. REN will receive 
the full amount of the 
allowed OPEX, so it has an 
incentive to reduce 
operational expenses. 
OPEX = OPEXN-1 x (1+GDPI 
– 1.5%) + Additional 
OPEX induced by grid 
expansion 
 
Depreciation of the RAB, 
net of subsidies. 
 
Inefficient Efficient Very Efficient 
CREF < 0.9 CREAL 
 
RoR = RoR Base 
RAB = Cost Real 
 
0.9 ≤ CREF/CREAL < 1.1 
 
RoR = RoR Base + 0.75% 
RAB = 0.5CREAL + 0.5CREF 
 
CREF/CREAL > 1.1 
 
 RoR = RoR Base + 0.75% 






















OPEX mechanism set by the regulator tries to provide good estimates of the real OPEX along with some incentives to increase efficiency by the operator. 
To achieve those estimates, the regulator goes through by defining a fixed component (FC), typically related with previous year real costs, and then a 
variable component (VC), where it sets one or more cost inductors related to the activity. 
 
Terminal – REN Atlântico 
- Fixed Component (103€) = 4645 based on the average of real costs and allowed income of 2014. 
- Variable Component1 (€/kWh) = 0,080804 related to the amount of LNG regasified. 
- Variable Component2 (€/kWh) = 0,0431 related to the amount of electricity used by the terminal. Instead of the IPIB, this one will evolve based 
on the annual average futures electricity price published by OMIP. 
REN Gasodutos 
- Fixed Component (103€) = 8294 based on energy transported costs and allowed revenues of 2014. 
- Variable Component (GWh/day) = 22,725 - last 12-months daily maximum of used capacity on exits. 
- Pass-through costs - related to LNG transportation by truck to remote zones (UAG's), which it should not be the responsibility of the TSO. This 
cost is received in its full amount if it does not exceed the annually published reference unitary costs.  
REN Armazenagem 
- Fixed Component (103€) =2505 - like the other activities, average of 2014 real costs and allowed revenues 
- Variable Component (EUR/GWh) = 0,24013 - energy extracted + injected in GWh is the main cost inductor 
GGS 
- Fixed Component (103€) = 1074 - estimated value of costs with group services for 2016. This activity follows a revenue-cap model, which does 
not require cost inductors like the other activities which are under a price-cap model. 
Distribution – REN Portgás 
- Fixed Component (103€) = 4864.4 based on 2014 operational costs 
- Variable Component1 (103€/MWh) = 0.000261 related to the amount of energy used for the distribution 



















Terminal – REN Atlântico 
Transportation – REN Gasodutos 
Storage – REN Armazenagem 
Global System Management – REN 
Gasodutos 
0.8 FC x (1+GDPd–2%) + 0.2 VC1 x (1+GDPd–2%) + VC2 x (1+∆ OMIP-2%) 
0.6 FC x (1+GDPd-3%) + 0.4VC x (1+GDPd-3%) + PC 
0.85 x FC x (1+GDPd-3%) + 0.15 x VC x (1+GDPd-3%) 



























Operational Risk | Innovations in the energy sector (OR2)  
The transmission system operators (TSO) are challenged by the rise of renewable energy sources, namely wind and solar, which enable both industrial and 
residential customers to install their own infrastructure independent from the system. In addition, the implementation of smart grids and technological 
advances in energy storage are also changing the structure of this industry and affecting TSOs turnover. These innovations in the energy sector allow 
customers to efficiently manage their energy consumption. Efficiency leads to decreases demand of both natural gas and electricity. 
 
Operational Risk | Lack of International Experience and scale (OR3) 
The acquisition of Electrogas in Chile was a new beginning in REN’s strategy to reduce exposure to Portugal, as investment opportunities are scarcer. 
However, the limited experience and know-how on how to operate in LATAM under different regulatory schemes may prove to be a challenge to REN. Also, 
REN does not have many resources to compete with its peers in a bidding war for an acquisition, due to their relative small size, thus prioritizing greenfield 
operations. REN’s conservative approach may also limit its investments abroad. 
 
Economic Risk | Chile Economic Outlook (ER1) 
REN has a 42,5% stake in Electrogas, SA. The company operates an important gas pipeline in Central Chile, and the performance of the investment will 
intrinsically depend on the economic performance of that country, expected to grow at 3.02% CAGR from 2018F to 2022F. One important issue is that REN 
is protected by take-or-pay contracts in which customers agree to buy a certain amount of natural gas, and if they fail to buy the agreed quantities the 
company must be compensated by them. 
 
Financial Risk | Incapacity to attract big fish (FR3)  
With the current 38% of free-float and concentrated positions limited to 25%, REN is not able to attract big institutional investors aiming for a controlling 
stake. Although, the capital increase mitigated the negative effect of liquidity and considering the buy-and-hold profile of investors in these kind of 
companies (dividend clientele effect), a liquidity discount was not considered in our analysis. 
 
Regulatory Risk | Fluctuations in Tariffs Deviations (RR3)  
As the tariffs are defined based on forecasts, deviations will always occur, which are referred as tariff deviations. REN receives the amount of the deviation 
plus interest two years after each tariff deviation. The regulator can be pressurized to avoid tariff increases  in the future. Increases in tariff deviations can 
also oblige REN to issue additional debt to meet working capital needs, thus increasing net debt and interest costs that lead to negative impacts on the 
credit ratings. 
 
Political Risk | Lose GSM via Nationalization (PR2)  
Recently a left-wing Portuguese party, Bloco de Esquerda, presented a proposal to the Portuguese Parliament aimed at nationalizing the General System 
Management, arguing that it was in the best interest of the public and an important strategical asset for the state. The still limited relevance of BE in the 
parliament justifies our low probability assessment. In terms of impact, it would be most noticed in operational efficiency since the value of the assets 




































































Bargaining Power of Suppliers | LOW 
Electricity is a kind of good in which the good itself and its transmission are inseparable. Companies in this industry do not buy or sell energy and therefore 
suppliers are linked to the construction of the infrastructures for electricity transmission. This impacts the growth of RAB, one of the key drivers of 
profitability, as well as their ability to reach the efficiency targets which guarantee a premium remuneration if investments are made below reference costs. 
It may also impact the way the company achieves efficiency related to operational expenditures as defined by the regulator. 
 
Threat of Substitutes | LOW 
Electricity itself does not have a substitute, however, there are alternative ways to produce it through renewable energy as well as several fossil fuels. The 
transmission business functions independent of the source of electricity and thus the only substitutes available are those created by consumers adopting 
self-sufficient alternatives. These alternatives, such as solar panels, are still mostly unproven on a large scale which moderates the level of this threat. 
Nevertheless, transmission will always exist.  
 
Bargaining Power of Buyers | LOW 
Energy transmission buyers are the full spectrum of the communities in which they serve: industrial, commercial, residential, municipal. As there are no 
substitutes, customers have no choice but to use the only energy transmission operator available. Demand for electricity is inelastic and it is an essential 
good for society, so the bargaining power of the consumer is very low. In addition, the regulator has a key role to ensure the supply of electricity at 
reasonable prices to consumers, while keeping in mind the operator’s interest. 
 
Threat of new entrants | INSIGNIFICANT 
The electricity transport industry enjoys high barriers to entry, as any new potential operator would require significant upfront land and capital 
investments. In this sense, the industry already relishes features of a natural monopoly. The Iberian market also has very strong legal barriers, with electric 
transport utilities operating under exclusive government concession contracts. This regulatory framework expands and solidifies these high barriers to 
entry, effecting a government monopoly, thus making the threat of new entrants insignificant. 
 
Competition within the Industry | INSIGNIFICANT 
Given the high barriers, the rivalry is at a minimum. Without competitors in this sector, firms act as monopolists. Expansion and investment are controlled 
by the regulator, as they must approve all investment plans to ensure the balance between consumers’ interests as well as all the interests of the players 




Bargaining Power of Suppliers | MODERATE 
NG in the Iberian market is imported, which exposes Iberia to the economic and political environment of the supplier’s countries. Even though subject to 
risks, those are mitigated by the take-or-pay clause established in the supply contracts. As in the electricity segment, the suppliers are also the ones who 
drive the construction and maintenance of assets, which plays a key role. 
 
Threat of Substitutes | MODERATE 
NG substitutes are the renewable sources of energy in the EM and electric heating in the residential & commercial part of CM. Decarbonization trends and 
climate change policies improve NG consumption in the short to medium-term, as they exercise pressure in the replacement of oil and coal. In the long-
term, however, it may lead to a lot of developments in renewables and electricity infrastructure which will inevitably hurt NG demand. The transmission 
and distribution do not face major treats. 
 
Bargaining Power of Buyers | LOW 
In the short run, the power of buyers is very low since the allowed revenues are controlled by the regulator. However, in the long run, if demand for NG 
decreases, tariffs and rates of remuneration are adjusted for the change resulting in a decrease in the regulated revenues. 
 
Threat of new entrants | LOW 
The NG transmission industry also has high barriers to entry including a strong legal barrier as they operate exclusively under concession contracts that 
create a natural monopoly position. There are very high costs to enter the market and the number of revenues received are subject to heavy regulation. 
The distribution is more dispersed in the number of operators, although the capital requirements and fulfilled demand prevents new entrants. 
 
Competition within the Industry | INSIGNIFICANT 
In the NG transport business, operators act as monopolists since concessions are awarded for large periods of time. It is a market where the necessary 
infrastructure demands large investment and know-how which leads to the high barriers to entry. This is seen by the Government as the model that best 
fits consumers’ interests in terms of quality and efficient service. Operator’s investment plans are subject to approval by the regulator to ensure that the 
final price consumers pay is fair and that the operator does not have power to independently determine prices. The NG distribution has more players, 

































 Revenues from TOTEX 
 
For our SoP Valuation, Revenues from TOTEX were split by segment by assuming the same weight of each segment in the previous total Revenues from 
OPEX. Revenues from TOTEX were computed as follows: 
 
𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒏𝒖𝒆𝒔 𝒇𝒓𝒐𝒎 𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑿 = (1 − 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) × 𝐴𝑙𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋 + 𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 
given that: 
𝑻𝑶𝑻𝑬𝑿 𝑨𝒍𝒍𝒐𝒘𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆 =  𝑇𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑡−1 × (1 + 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝐼 − 1.5%) 
 












2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Revenues From Assets 458,04 445,84 444,42 441,36 438,57 436,69 436,18
RAB Remuneration 224,50 211,82 210,72 209,16 207,24 205,97 205,14
Smoothing Differences ( gas) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Remuneration of fully amortized assets 21,60 24,30 27,20 29,30 31,94 34,81 37,94
Recovery of Amortizations (net of investment subsidies) 211,94 209,72 206,50 202,90 199,39 195,92 193,10
Electricity 140,68 141,14 139,30 136,82 134,66 132,75 130,60
Natural Gas 52,13 50,14 48,55 47,19 45,60 43,77 42,91
REN PORTGAS 19,13 18,44 18,65 18,88 19,14 19,40 19,59
Amortization of investment subsidies 16,40 15,82 15,25 14,71 14,19 13,68 13,19
Revenues from TOTEX 120,74 114,41 102,39 101,44 85,07 99,64 105,88
Recovery of TOTEX 111,25 105,12 99,11 97,23 94,75 101,39 103,02
TOTEX Incentive 9,50 9,30 3,28 4,21 (9,7) (1,8) 2,86
Other Revenues 31,05 31,20 31,35 31,51 31,82 32,15 32,50
Own Works ( Capitalised in Investment) 15,18 13,65 13,01 12,31 14,18 14,65 14,24
Earnings on Construction Assets- Concession Assets 122,82 111,35 106,49 101,19 115,32 118,85 115,76
OPEX (126,5) (123,2) (120,8) (120,3) (116,9) (119,4) (120,6)
Personnel Costs (56,0) (54,3) (53,1) (52,7) (51,0) (52,1) (52,6)
External Costs (70,5) (68,9) (67,7) (67,5) (65,9) (67,3) (67,9)
Construction Costs- Concession Assets (122,8) (111,3) (106,5) (101,2) (115,3) (118,9) (115,8)
Impairments 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
EBITDA 514,92 497,75 485,60 481,07 466,96 477,44 481,42
Depreciation and Amortizations (228,3) (225,5) (221,8) (217,6) (213,6) (209,6) (206,3)
EBIT 286,58 272,21 263,84 263,46 253,38 267,84 275,12
€M 2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
OPEX 124,84 122,82 122,87 122,68 122,51 122,55 122,79
CAPEX 138,21 125,21 119,71 113,71 129,71 133,71 130,21
TOTEX Incurred 263,05 248,03 242,58 236,39 252,22 256,26 253,00
TOTEX Allowance 278,12 262,79 247,78 243,07 236,86 253,48 257,54
Variations from TOTEX 15,07 14,76 5,20 6,68 (15,4) (2,8) 4,54
Incentive rate 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63% 63%
TOTEX Incentive 9,50 9,30 3,28 4,21 (9,7) (1,8) 2,86
2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Revenues from TOTEX 120,74 114,41 102,39 101,44 85,07 99,64 105,88
Electricity 68,03 64,82 58,32 58,09 48,97 57,66 61,59
Natural Gas 39,04 36,64 32,47 31,86 26,46 30,69 32,29
REN Portgás 13,67 12,95 11,60 11,49 9,64 11,30 12,00
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 RAB Remuneration 
 
For our SoP Valuation, Transfers to RAB were split by segment by assuming the same weight of each segment in the previous total Transfers to RAB. 
Transfers to RAB were computed as follows: 
 


































2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
TOTEX Allowance 278,12 262,79 247,78 243,07 236,86 253,48 257,54
Capitalisation rate 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60% 60%
Total Transfers to RAB 166,87 157,67 148,67 145,84 142,12 152,09 154,53
Electricity 153,02 114,10 101,20 103,86 106,08 99,75 98,45
Natural Gas 13,37 19,52 22,47 16,32 9,83 27,69 31,75
REN Portgás 0,48 24,05 25,00 25,66 26,21 24,65 24,32
2017F 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F 2022F 2023F
Average RAB
Electricity 2 153,60 2 117,61 2 054,47 1 992,81 1 932,62 1 866,46 1 808,10
Natural Gas 1 072,38 1 037,39 1 004,22 965,30 922,28 900,11 880,87
Land 256,35 244,93 234,02 223,60 213,64 204,12 195,03
REN Portgás 451,6 456,52 463,08 470,09 477,41 482,92 487,84
RoR
Electricity 6,06% 5,65% 5,77% 5,88% 6,00% 6,11% 6,23%
Natural Gas 6,02% 6,02% 6,13% 6,25% 6,37% 6,48% 6,60%
Land 0,36% 0,36% 0,36% 0,36% 0,36% 0,36% 0,36%
REN Portgás 6,32% 6,32% 6,43% 6,55% 6,67% 6,78% 6,90%
RAB Remuneration 224,50 211,82 210,72 209,16 207,24 205,97 205,14
Electicity 130,55 119,66 118,48 117,23 115,93 114,13 112,66
Natural Gas 64,51 62,43 61,60 60,33 58,71 58,35 58,12
Land 0,92 0,88 0,84 0,80 0,77 0,73 0,70












Sales 552 569 3 249 3 249 3 249 3 249 3 249 3 249 3 249 0%
Services rendered 536 544 544 672 590 243 571 709 558 265 554 257 535 098 547 793 553 518 -1%
Revenue from construction of concession assets 240 002 171 247 138 000 125 000 119 500 113 500 129 500 133 500 130 000 -1%
Gains from associates and joint ventures 768 1 314 8 813 8 963 9 116 9 272 9 590 9 922 10 266 3%
Operating Grants 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Other operating income 41 279 21 649 23 927 23 343 22 780 22 236 21 713 21 207 20 720 -2%
Operating income 819 144 739 452 764 232 732 264 712 909 702 515 699 150 715 671 717 753 -1%
Cost of goods sold (562,0) (450,0) (1 762,4) (1 762,4) (1 762,4) (1 762,4) (1 762,4) (1 762,4) (1 762,4) 0%
Cost with construction of concession assets (222 602,0) (155 217,0) (122 816,2) (111 346,3) (106 490,3) (101 192,8) (115 319,4) (118 851,0) (115 760,8) -1%
External supplies and services (42 636,0) (44 328,0) (54 723,2) (53 098,5) (51 984,6) (51 783,7) (50 164,7) (51 510,3) (52 174,6) -1%
Personnel costs (51 673,0) (49 583,0) (54 258,2) (52 554,6) (51 319,0) (50 950,9) (49 189,9) (50 357,2) (50 883,7) -1%
Depreciation and amortizations (209 303,0) (214 761,0) (228 340,6) (225 535,0) (221 755,9) (217 612,1) (213 578,0) (209 598,2) (206 296,8) -2%
Provisions 302 (516,0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Impairment of trade receivables (683,0) (258,0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Other expenses (11 893,0) (12 595,0) (15 755,0) (15 755,0) (15 755,0) (15 755,0) (15 755,0) (15 755,0) (15 755,0) 0%
Operating costs (539 049,0) (477 708,0) (477 655,7) (460 051,8) (449 067,1) (439 057,0) (445 769,3) (447 834,1) (442 633,3) -1%
Operating results 280 095 261 743 286 577 272 212 263 842 263 458 253 380 267 837 275 119 -1%
Financial costs (110 503,0) (91 182,0) (78 569,7) (77 455,9) (77 634,4) (73 895,9) (75 254,1) (76 419,1) (91 348,9) 3%
Financial income 6 339 5 291 9 485 9 485 9 485 9 485 9 485 9 485 9 485 0%
Investment income - dividends 5 592 5 550 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 0%
Financial results (98 572,0) (80 341,0) (49 101,7) (47 987,9) (48 166,4) (44 427,9) (45 786,1) (46 951,1) (61 880,9) 4%
Profit before income tax 181 523 181 403 237 475 224 224 215 676 219 030 207 594 220 886 213 238 -2%
Income tax expense (39 963,0) (55 282,0) (69 160,1) (69 035,6) (66 342,9) (67 399,4) (63 797,2) (67 984,1) (65 575,1) -1%
Energy sector extraordinary contribution (ESEC) (25 445,0) (25 938,0) (25 798,0) (25 503,2) (24 997,3) 0 0 0 0 -100%
NET PROFIT FOR THE YEAR 116 115 100 183 142 517 129 685 124 336 151 631 143 797 152 902 147 663 1%
ATTRIBUTABLE TO: n.a.
Shareholders of the Company 116 115 100 183 142 517 129 685 124 336 151 631 143 797 152 902 147 663 1%
Non-controlling interests 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Consolidated profit for the year 116 115 100 183 142 517 129 685 124 336 151 631 143 797 152 902 147 663 1%
Earnings per share (expressed in € per share) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1%
CAGR (2017F-
2023F)
2023F2022F2017F             2018F 2019F 2020F 2021FCONSOLIDATED INCOME STATEMENT €'000 2015 2016
CASH FLOW FROM OPERATIONS 504 628 437 204 373 291 392 684 392 035 392 769 395 783 -4%
Operating Results 286 577 272 212 263 842 263 458 253 380 267 837 275 119 -1%
Depreciations & Amortizations 228 341 225 535 221 756 217 612 213 578 209 598 206 297 -2%
Gains/Losses in Associates and J&V (8 813,0) (8 963,0) (9 116,0) (9 272,1) (9 590,4) (9 921,5) (10 265,9) 3%
Provisions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Impairments 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 n.a.
Changes in NWC 61 138 53 131,2 -1 874 -2 691 8 129 596 -2 264 n.a.
Changes in Non Current Operational Assets (9 476,0) 5 147,8 46,4 (264,1) 133,0 (666,4) (422,6) -40%
Changes in Non Current Payables 8 403,9 (15 320,8) (10 023,5) (8 759,3) (9 797,6) (6 690,6) (7 105,7) n.a.
Income Tax (94 958,1) (94 538,8) (91 340,2) (67 399,4) (63 797,2) (67 984,1) (65 575,1) -6%
Changes in Deffered tax Assets (17 145,0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Changes in Deffered tax Liablities 50 561 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
CASH FLOW FROM FINANCING ACTIVITIES 408 700 (272 753,7) (265 692,6) (235 771,1) (237 206,9) (238 924,6) (263 815,0) n.a.
Net Interest Expense (69 084,7) (67 970,9) (68 149,4) (64 410,9) (65 769,1) (66 934,1) (81 863,9) 3%
Dividends Paid (90 650,3) (113 426,0) (113 426,0) (116 261,6) (119 168,2) (122 147,4) (125 201,1) 6%
Share Capital Increase 133 191 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Issue Premium 116 809 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Changes in Debt 318 435 (91 356,8) (84 117,1) (55 098,5) (52 269,6) (49 843,1) (56 750,0) n.a.
CASH FLOW FROM INVESTMENT ACTIVITIES (811 864,0) (97 739,1) (92 089,3) (85 936,4) (101 624,6) (105 300,4) (101 463,2) -29%
Concession Assets (138 000,0) (125 000,0) (119 500,0) (113 500,0) (129 500,0) (133 500,0) (130 000,0) -1%
Property Plant and Equiment (214,0) (214,0) (214,0) (214,0) (214,0) (214,0) (214,0) 0%
Dividends Received (Available for Sale Assets) 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 19 983 0%
Acquisiton REN PORTGAS (531 693,0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Acquisition Electrogas (169 285,0) 0 0 0 0 0 0 -100%
Dividends Electrogas 7 345 7 492 7 642 7 795 8 106 8 431 8 768 3%Cash a  Cash Equivalents in the beggining of the 
period 10 780 112 244 178 955 194 464 265 440 318 644 367 188 80%
NET CHANGES IN CASH 101 464 66 711 15 509 70 977 53 203 48 544 30 505 -18%
Cash and Cash Equivalents in the end of the period 112 244 178 955 194 464 265 440 318 644 367 188 397 693 23%
CAGR (2017F-
2023F)
2022F 2023F2017FCash Flow Statement (000' Euros) 2018F 2019F 2020F 2021F
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Appendix 29: List of Abbreviations 
 
Redes Energéticas Nacionais, S.G.P.S, S.A (REN) 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
Dividend Discount Model (DDM) 
Direção Geral de Energia e Geologia (DGEG) 
Debt- to - Enterprise Value (D/EV) 
Debt-to-Equity (D/E) 
Dividend per Share (DPS) 
Dividend Yield (DY) 
Basis point(s) (bp(s)) 
Board of Directors (BoD) 
Entidade Reguladora dos Serviços Energéticos (ERSE) 
Enterprise Value (EV) 
Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciations and Amortizations (EBITDA) 
Energias de Portugal (EDP) 
Energias de Portugal Distribuição (EDPD) 
Electricity Market (EM) 
European Comission (EC) 
European Central Bank (ECB) 
Energy Sector Extraordinary Contribution (ESEC) 
Equity Risk Premium (EQR) 
Earnings (E)  
Cash Flow (CF) 
Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) 
Chief Operations Officer (COO) 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
Cost of Equity (Re or Ke) 
Cost of Debt (Rd) 
Capital Expenditures (CAPEX) 
Comissão do Mercado e Valores Mobiliários (CMVM) 
Conventional Market (CM) 
Forecasted (F) 
Free Cash Flow to the Firm (FCFF) 
Free Cash Flow to Equity (FCFE) 
Sum of the parts (SoP) 
Share (sh) 
Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
Sum of Absolute Rank Differences (SARD) 
Rate of Return (RoR) 
Regulated Asset Base (RAB) 
Return on Equity (ROE) 
Red Electrica de España (REE) 
Risk- Free Rate (RFR) 
Natural Gas (NG) 
National Electric System (SEN) 
National Natural Gas System (SNGN) 
Net Profit Margin (NPM) 
Year End (YE) 
Year (Y) 
Yield-to-Maturity (YTM) 
Year on Year (YoY) 
Latin America (LATAM) 
Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) 
Price (P) 
Price to Earnings (P/E) 
Price to Book (P/B) 
Price to Dividend (P/D) 
Price Target (PT) 
Price Value per Basis Point (PVBP) 
Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 
Millions (M) 
Mega Watts (MW) 
Mercado Ibérico de Electricidade (MIBEL) 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
Kilometers (KM) 
Key Perfomance Indicators (KPI) 
International Transmissions Operations and Maintenance Study (ITOMS) 
Transmission System Operator (TSO) 
Total Expenditure (TOTEX) 
Operational Expenditures (OPEX) 
Quantitative Easing (QE) 
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